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Preface 
 
 
 
 
This collection of essays represents the work of five first and second year students at Rollins 
College who spent the spring of 2016 investigating the limits of scientific and religious thought. 
The work begins with an investigation of the mind-body problem by Arden Baxter, who argues 
that the mind is not reducible to the brain in practice even if it may be in theory. Evan Rapone 
opines that a new and concise definition of science is required, and then provides one. In an 
analysis of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason Madeleine Scott suggests that “the unthinkable will 
become thinkable” should we be able to transcend the limits of cognitive science by combining it 
with philosophical investigation. Morgan McConnell investigates the relationship between 
metaphors and models and concludes that the limits of science are intimately connected to the 
limits of language. Finally, Sara Nelson brings a Christian perspective to the work and proposes 
that the nature of the divine ensures that humans can never answer some of the most fundamental 
questions. 
 
The research skills and level understanding necessary to produce these essays exceeds what can 
reasonably expected of a college sophomore. Yet, although the expectation is unreasonable, these 
students have risen to the challenge and produced a body of work that encompasses both historical 
perspective and original thought. We have enjoyed accompanying these young scholars through 
the process and hope you will be both enlightened and impressed by the work. 
 
Mario D’Amato 
Thomas Moore 
Winter Park, Florida 
 
 
 
 Reductionism, Emergence, and the Mind-Body Problem 
 
Arden Baxter 
 
The view that the human mind is unique and behaves differently from anything else in the 
universe is a belief that has been held and widely accepted for centuries. The world’s major 
religions hold as a central tenet the idea that the mind can exist independently of the body and the 
brain and is, in fact, distinct from the physical world (Rae 64). In the realm of science, the mind 
lives at the outskirts of that which has been defined, demanding the answer to the fundamental 
question: “Can everything be reduced to the fundamental constituents of the world? Or can there 
be, and are there, non-reducible, or emergent entities, properties and laws?” (Silberstein 80). Such 
thought is the basis for theories of scientific reductionism and emergence.  
 Scientific reductionism is the theory that there exists a base science such that every science 
can be reduced to the fundamental entities described by this basic level. Within the realm of the 
sciences, reductionism claims that all sciences can be reduced to the basic level of physics. 
Reductionism is understood as a way to “unify the sciences” (Ney). The theory of reductionism is 
generally classified by two distinct categories: ontological and epistemological. The ontological 
form of reductionism concentrates on the “real world items—entities, events, properties, etc.” 
whereas the epistemological form of reductionism focuses on “representational items—theories, 
concepts, models, frameworks, schemas, regularities, etc.” (Silberstein 82). Each distinction aims 
to rationalize the world by reducing its specific elements down to their  “simplest” form. An 
important principle of reductionism stems from Nagel’s introduction of bridge laws, or bridge 
principles. Bridge laws are described as “bi-conditionals” that link the terms in the vocabulary of 
the two theories that are being considered for reduction (Riel). Many reductionists state that the 
derivation of laws constitutes reduction only in instances where the bridge principles have the 
“status of identities,” meaning that the bridge principles are themselves ontological (Ney). Because 
of this, Nagel’s discussion of reduction is said to be a relation that holds between both theories and 
their ontologies (Riel). This distinction is important when discussing the mind-body problem, since 
in this case, reduction refers to ontological simplification rather than the unity of scientific theories 
(Ney).  
 In contrast to the theory of reductionism, the theory of emergence deems that “emergent 
entities ‘arise’ out of more fundamental entities and yet are ‘novel’ or ‘irreducible’ with respect to 
them” (O’Connor). In other words, in the special sciences, like psychology, there exist certain 
properties that cannot be reduced. In a fashion similar to reductionism, emergence can be separated 
into the ontological and epistemological divisions. Ontological emergence, known as the strong 
form of emergence, claims that evolution produces entirely new and ontologically distinct levels 
of science which are “characterized by their own laws or regularities and causal forces” (Culp). In 
the case of psychology, ontological emergence claims that the laws of psychology are distinct from 
those of physics. The weak form of emergence, known as epistemological emergence, holds that 
new levels are created, or “emerge,” but that these levels still follow the “fundamental causal 
processes of physics,” that is, their laws still follow the laws of physics (Culp). Emergence 
arguments focus on predictability and irreducibility. In the case of predictability, emergentists 
claim that certain properties are unpredictable from “knowledge of their lower bases” (Kim, 
“Making Sense” 14). In other words, even with complete knowledge of the neurophysiology of 
the brain, we would still not be able to accurately predict which mental states or events would arise 
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from a given neurobiological state or event. From an irreducibility standpoint, emergentists 
provide the arguments of multiple realization, mental generalizations, and mental intentionality, 
which will be introduced through my discussions of Fodor and Kim. 
 Both theories of reductionism and emergence attempt to answer the mind-body problem, 
the problem of explaining how mental states, events and processes—like beliefs, desires, and 
decisions—are related to physical states, events, and processes. Under the assumption that the 
human body is a physical entity, what then can we claim of the mind? Are the mind and the body 
one and the same, or do properties and laws of the mind emerge from the body? 
 Given the reductionist view of the mind-body problem, the relationship between the mind 
and the body is that the mind is the body. That is, all mental states are themselves neurobiological 
states. For example, the mental state of pain could be discovered to be the neurobiological state of 
C-fibers firing. If we were to consider that mental states could be reduced to neurobiological states, 
then the science of psychology would not be autonomous and would not be necessary in the realm 
of scientific investigation. In other words, in our previous example of pain, if pain is reducible to 
C-fibers firing, then any discussion of the mental state pain could be replaced by the 
neurobiological state of C-fibers firing, making the mental state of pain irrelevant. Patricia 
Churchland believes this application of reductionism to the mind-body problem is valid and her 
arguments will be examined further.  
 It seems reasonable to suggest that psychological states have a physical basis. In fact, most 
reductionists and antireductionists would not deny that the investigation of the mind is one of 
“finding a place for the mind in a world that is fundamentally and essentially physical” (Kim, “The 
Mind-Body Problem” 169). Yet does this imply that mental states can be reduced to 
neurobiological states? Emergentists would argue that the mind could retain a physical basis and 
nevertheless have emergent properties that are irreducible to any physical foundation. According 
to the emergentist, mental states like “perceiving blue” are uniquely psychological. That is, even 
if it has a neurobiological correlate, the state of  “perceiving blue” is a novel property that emerges 
at an entirely new level—the level of the mind, separate from that of the brain.  
 In this investigation of the mind-body problem, I will discuss the mind in terms of both the 
theories of scientific reductionism and emergence. To develop the arguments for emergence, I will 
examine the positions of Fodor, a token physicalist, and Kim, an emergentist. In addition, I will 
discuss the arguments of Churchland, a neurophilosopher, in order to develop the position of 
reductionism. I posit that our current understanding of the mind is best expressed with the theory 
of token physicalism. Thus, ontological reduction is most likely achieved in principle. However, 
there is a clear argument for the necessity of epistemological emergence in practice. By extending 
upon Fodor’s initial argument of the existence of irreducible generalizations at the level of the 
special sciences, I will argue that to maintain effective communication, psychology must be 
autonomous. 
 
Fodor: Argument Against Strong Reductionism 
In his article entitled “Special Sciences (Or: The Disunity of Science as a Working 
Hypothesis),” Jerry Fodor argues that “reductivism is too strong of a constraint upon the unity of 
science,” that is, classical reductionism does not justify that there exists one unified science (101). 
However, he claims that the weaker doctrine of reductionism, known as token physicalism, “will 
preserve the desired consequences of reductivism” (101).  
 Fodor begins by characterizing reductivism as the “view that all the special sciences reduce 
to physics” and that any law of the special science can be represented through the appropriate 
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bridge laws that will lead to the law of the special science being reduced to a physical law (98). 
Under this interpretation of reductivism, Fodor states that bridge laws must be considered to 
express event identities. This leads us to the definition of token physicalism, which is “the claim 
that all the events that the sciences talk about are physical events” (Fodor 100). In other words, 
every event in any special science, such as psychology, has a mapped correlate to a physical event. 
For example, under token physicalism, the psychological event of “perceiving blue” would have a 
correlated neurological event.  
 Token physicalism is weaker than materialism, type physicalism, and reductionism. 
Materialism “claims both that token physicalism is true and every event falls under the laws of 
some science or other” (Fodor 100). In other words, every event is the result of material interaction. 
Since this seems like a reasonable statement, most token physicalists can be said to be materialists 
as well. Type physicalism differs from token physicalism in that it considers “every property 
mentioned in the laws of science is a physical property” (Fodor 100). Type physicalism is 
concerned with whether the kinds of properties of the special sciences can be reduced to the same 
lower-level kinds of properties, whereas token physicalism is concerned with whether a certain 
property of the special sciences correlates to some particular, but not necessarily identical, physical 
property. Lastly, token physicalism is weaker than reductivism, which joins the idea of token 
physicalism with the idea “that there are natural kind predicates,” also known as entities possessing 
properties bound by natural law, in physics which “correspond to each natural kind predicate in an 
ideally completed special science” (Fodor 100). This is the burden of Fodor’s argument to follow.  
 According to Fodor, “every science employs a descriptive vocabulary of theoretical and 
observation predicates such that events fall under the laws of science by virtue of satisfying those 
predicates” (101). Specifically, every science creates its own vocabulary to decide which events 
are to be considered a part of that particular science. Fodor defines natural kind predicates of a 
science as “the ones whose terms are the bound variables in its proper laws,” that is, natural kind 
predicates are the events that are relevant to and whose laws are bound by the particular science 
(102). In other words, natural kind predicates are a necessary part of the descriptive vocabulary of 
the science. Fodor claims that reductivism is “too strong of a construal of the doctrine of the unity 
of science” because if reductivism were taken to be true, then “every natural kind is, or is co-
extensive with, a physical natural kind” (102). For example, if reductivism were taken to be true 
for psychology, then every natural kind predicate of psychology is related to a natural kind 
predicate of physics. The previous statement is unlikely for the special sciences for the following 
reasons: generalizations can often be made about “events whose physical descriptions have 
nothing in common,” whether the physical descriptions of the events considered by these 
generalizations have anything in common is “entirely irrelevant to the truth of the generalizations,” 
and the special sciences produce these kinds of generalizations (Fodor 103).  
 Fodor considers the special science of economics to demonstrate his arguments against 
strong reductionism. If one is to examine monetary exchanges, for example, Fodor concedes 
“physics is general in the sense that it implies that any event which consists of a monetary exchange 
has a true description in the vocabulary of physics and in virtue of which it falls under the laws of 
physics” (103). Expressly, Fodor does not deny that monetary exchanges could be described within 
the vocabulary of physics and that, in principle, economics follows the laws of physics. Yet the 
problem arises with the generalization of monetary exchange. It seems unreasonable to suggest 
that “a disjunction of physical predicates” which includes all forms of monetary exchange events 
(exchanges of dollar bills, exchanges made by credit card, exchanges made by check, etc.) could 
express a single “physical natural kind” (Fodor 103). Fodor claims, “the reasons why economics 
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is unlikely to reduce to physics are paralleled by those which suggest that psychology is unlikely 
to reduce to neurology,” namely the irreducibility of the generalizations of the special sciences 
(104). Similar to Kim’s later argument of multiple realization, Fodor states that psychological ends 
may be achieved through a wide variety of neurological means.  
  Strong reductionists have attempted to combat the multiple realization theory by 
suggesting that an event of the special science can be mapped to the disjunction of physical 
predicates. For example, our psychological event “perceiving blue” could be mapped to the 
neurological event of the occurrence of neural pattern A, neural pattern B, or neural pattern C. Yet 
when we begin to discuss the correlation between different psychological events, this all becomes 
convoluted. Furthermore, Fodor argues that the disjunction of physical predicates (neural patterns 
A, B, or C in our previous example) cannot itself be considered a natural kind predicate (109).  
 Fodor argues that the weaker doctrine of reductivism, namely token physicalism, “allows 
us to see how the laws of the special sciences could reasonably have exceptions, and, second, it 
allows us to see why there are special sciences at all” (110). If we wanted to preserve the special 
sciences as exceptionless, we could “require the taxonomies of the special sciences,” or the 
classifications of the special sciences, “to correspond to the taxonomy of physics” by insisting that 
a distinction be made between events of the special sciences that correspond to a distinct event in 
physics (Fodor 112). Therefore, any specific event of the special sciences that corresponds to a 
specific natural kind event in physics would be classified autonomously from the other events of 
the special sciences. However, this distinction between particular events would erase any 
generalizations that the special sciences express. Therefore, we must accept physics as the 
exceptionless “bedrock science” and the special sciences as specialized taxonomies able to state 
generalizations, and thus able to have exceptions of their own (Fodor 112). It is for this reason that 
it is not “required that the taxonomies which the special sciences employ must themselves reduce 
to the taxonomy of physics” and that Fodor suggests strong reductionism is too strong a constraint 
upon the unity of science (Fodor 114).  
 
Kim: Emergence Prospective 
 Jaegwon Kim, a Korean-American philosopher best known for his work on mental 
causation and the mind-body problem, describes an emergent property in terms of its 
supervenience and its inability to be explained or predicted (“Emergence: Core Ideas”). The 
supervenience proposition states: “If property M emerges from properties N1, . . ., Nn, then M 
supervenes on N1, . . ., Nn” (Kim, “Emergence: Core Ideas” 550). In other words, systems that 
have similar basal conditions must be alike in their emergent properties. It is reasonable to suggest 
that an emergentist would not deny that pain, for instance, would emerge if “the very same 
configuration of physiological events were to recur” (Kim, “Emergence: Core Ideas” 550). 
Regarding the mind-body problem, supervenience suggests, “mental life is wholly dependent on, 
and determined by, what happens with our bodily processes” (Kim, “Mental Causation” 14). 
Namely, the mental properties of the mind depend on the physical properties of the body.  
 Supervenience seems to be widely accepted among both reductionists and emergentists. 
However, emergentists deny that “predictability and explainability hold for an emergent and its 
basal conditions” (Kim, “Emergence: Core Ideas” 551). Predictability and explainability are the 
two main arguments for the theory of emergence. If pain is thought to emerge from a certain neural 
state, emergentists claim this correlation cannot be explained. Furthermore, “full and ideally 
complete knowledge of the neurophysiology of the brain does not suffice for prediction of 
conscious states” (Kim, “Emergence: Core Ideas” 551). Even if we had complete knowledge of 
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the neural states of the brain, Kim argues that we would not be able to precisely and accurately 
predict which mental states would arise from each neural state. This begs the question, why do 
bridge laws hold? This question of explanation is a prominent argument against Nagel’s use of 
bridge principles to justify reduction. For the emergentists, “Nagelian reduction allows the use of 
psychoneural correlations” (i.e. bridge principles) as “unexplained additional premises of 
reductive derivation” (Kim, “Emergence: Core Ideas” 552). Thus, Nagel’s bridge principles cannot 
be scientifically explained, which affects the validity of the theory of reductionism.   
 Among emergentists, there are two central theories that affect understanding of the 
emergent properties of the mind: multiple realization and downward causation. Multiple 
realization, believed to refute psychophysical reductionism, describes mental states as “capable of 
‘realization’, ‘instantiation’, or ‘implementation’ in widely diverse neural-biological structures in 
humans, felines, reptiles” or other organisms (Kim, “Multiple Realization” 1).  That is to say, if 
infinitely many physical properties can realize an emergent property B, then B will not be reducible 
to a basic physical property (Kim, “Multiple Realization”). One of the first philosophers to explore 
multiple realization, Hilary Putnam claimed that “classic reductive theories of the mind” suggest 
that “for each psychological kind M there is a unique physical kind P that is nomologically 
coextensive with it” (Kim, “Multiple Realization” 4). Here, classic reductive theories of the mind 
suggest that each mental event has a distinct physical event in which both events cover the same 
entities in a lawful way. Putnam argued that this thesis, known as the Correlation Thesis, is 
“empirically false” (Kim, “Multiple Realization” 5). According to Putnam, if the Correlation 
Thesis was to be validated just for the mental state of pain, a physical-chemical state would have 
to be specified such that any organism could be said to be in pain if and only if its brain was in that 
specified physical-chemical state (Kim, “Multiple Realization”). Thus, antireductionists define 
mental properties as not possessing “nomically coextensive physical properties” (i.e. any mental 
property does not correlate to any one unique physical property) and favor the position of multiple 
realization (Kim, “Multiple Realization” 6).   
 The theory of downward causation assumes that emergent properties have their own 
“distinctive causal powers,” or powers to affect other properties, and are able to “exercise their 
causal powers downward,” meaning to the lower levels from which they emerge (Kim, “Making 
Sense” 19). Keeping the layered model of the scientific world in mind, three types of causation 
occur: same-level, downward, and upward. Same-level causation involves relationships between 
two properties at the same level, downward causation arises when a higher-level property causes 
the “instantiation” of a lower-level property, and upward causation arises from a lower-level 
property causing the instantiation of a higher-level property (Kim, “Making Sense”). If we are to 
assume that the “causal powers of mental properties are novel, and irreducible to the causal powers 
of the physical properties,” then we are forced to find causal powers of the emergent property that 
are not causal powers of the “physical and biological properties from which it emerges” (Kim, 
“Downward Causation” 135). Therefore, by the theory of emergence, mental properties must have 
novel causal powers. According to Kim, “these powers must manifest themselves by causing either 
physical properties or other mental properties” (“Downward Causation” 136). However, if a 
mental property causes another mental property, “the only way to cause an emergent property to 
be instantiated is by causing its emergent base property to be instantiated” (Kim, “Downward 
Causation” 136). This combination of upward determination and downward causation remains a 
paradox within the emergentist conception of mental causation.  
 Kim presents the mind-body problem as the “relationship between mind and matter,” 
primarily the interconnection of mental causation and consciousness (“Mental Causation” 1). Kim 
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claims that mental causation is key in that “the possibility of human agency, and hence our moral 
practice, evidently requires that our mental states have causal effects in the physical world” 
(“Mental Causation” 9). It seems reasonable to suggest that our mental desires, beliefs, and 
decisions must manage to cause our physical bodies to change in the appropriate fashion, as shown 
in our ability to “find food and shelter, build bridges and cities, and destroy the rainforests” (Kim, 
“Mental Causation” 9). Yet how can we begin to justify that these mental properties, indeed, have 
a causal effect on physical properties?  
The theory of reductionism naturally suggests that mental properties can be reduced to their 
physical basal properties, and through this reduction process, their physical causal effects are 
identified. Kim attempts to deny the reductionist theory of the mind by focusing his arguments on 
the mental state of pain (“Mental Causation”). According to Kim, to reduce pain, it must first be 
functionalized, that is, it must be shown that  “being in pain is definable as being in a state that is 
caused by certain inputs and that in turn causes certain behavioral and other outputs” (“Mental 
Causation” 24). By way of explanation, functionalism states that to be in pain is to have a certain 
internal state that performs a certain function, or job. In the case of pain, it can be said that pain is 
the state that is activated by bodily damage and causes a physical reaction, like a scream, for 
instance. Once functionalization is accomplished, the realizers, or the “states or properties that 
satisfy the causal specification defining that mental property,” must be identified (Kim, “Mental 
Causation” 24). Kim does not refute the existence of realizers for mental properties, but does refute 
the possibility of functionalizing mental properties (“Mental Causation”). Kim believes that 
“phenomenal properties of consciousness,” also known as qualia, “are not functional properties” 
(“Mental Causation” 27). Because Kim declares qualia to be non-functional properties, he states 
that “qualia are functionally irreducible” and therefore emergent (“Mental Causation” 27). Since 
mental properties are not functionally definable, mental causation remains unexplainable for 
phenomenal mental properties (Kim, “Mental Causation”). According to Kim, “the functional 
irreducibility of consciousness” necessitates that both the problem of consciousness and the 
problem of mental causation remain unsolvable. Consciousness cannot be defined in terms of its 
causal relations and mental causation cannot explain consciousness (Kim, “Mental Causation”). 
This dependence relation is a major area of perplexity in the theory of emergent properties of 
consciousness. 
 
Churchland: Defense of Reductionism 
 Patricia Churchland, noted for her contributions to neurophilosophy and the philosophy of 
mind, has developed two general positions for those who deny the possibility of reduction. The 
first class of arguments against reductionism claims that “the human brain is more complicated 
than it is smart, and hence neuroscience cannot hope, even in the long run, to fathom the mystery 
of how it works” (Churchland 315). Since this argument is empirical, Churchland focuses on 
refuting the second set of arguments against reduction, which is advanced by those who “find 
principled reasons for skepticism, deriving for example from the nature of subjective experience 
or from the fact that some mental states have meaning and significance” (316). Churchland refers 
to those who advance arguments of this type as “principled skeptics.”  
 Arguments defending principled skeptics fall into two distinct categories. The first 
category holds the position that “there is a distinctive mental dimension that is not reducible to 
anything physical” (Churchland 316). Substance dualism claims this irreducible mental dimension 
“harbors a separate mental substance such as a nonphysical mind or soul,” whereas property 
dualism states this mental dimension is “limited to nonphysical properties of the physical brain” 
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(Churchland 316). The second category of arguments defending a principled skepticism of 
reductionism focuses on the “hypothesis that generalizations of psychology are emergent with 
respect to the generalizations of neuroscience and that mental states and processes constitute a 
domain of study autonomous with respect to neuroscience” (Churchland 317). Antireductionist 
arguments of this type are considered functionalist and can be seen throughout the work of Fodor.  
 Substance dualists hypothesize that mental states are not states of the brain, but instead are 
of a different substance altogether. Churchland argues that a clear problem for substance dualists 
is the “nature of the interaction between the two radically different kinds of substance” (318). In 
other words, how can two distinct substances have such an interconnected relationship? According 
to Churchland, mental states are not independent from the processes of the brain considering 
“reasoning, consciousness, moral feelings, religious feelings, political convictions, aesthetic 
judgments, moods, even one’s deep-seated personality traits—all can be affected if the brain is 
affected by drugs or by lesions, for example” (319). This clearly shows that the mental dimension 
of the mind must have a level of dependence on the brain. Evolutionary biology further diminishes 
the plausibility of substance dualism. If we assume that humans have evolved from earlier 
mammalian species, then how can we explain the origins of the nonphysical mental dimension? 
At what point did the nonphysical mental dimension of the mind arise from the physical dimension 
of the brain? 
 Unlike substance dualism, property dualism accepts the mental dimension as a physical 
substance, yet is based on the conviction that “even if the mind is the brain, the qualities of 
subjective experience are nevertheless emergent with respect to the brain and its properties” 
(Churchland 323). For property dualists, subjective experiences have uniquely mental qualities 
that are irreducible. In line with the emergentist argument, brain states are “causally connected to 
subjective experience” but the subjective experience itself cannot be reduced to “some process or 
aspect of neuronal activity” (Churchland 325). For example, property dualists would claim that the 
“blueness” of water is an emergent property with respect to the physics of H2O molecules on the 
basis that the character of “blueness” cannot be predicted from any microphysical information. 
Churchland argues that “reduction does not require that reduced properties, as conceived within 
their older conceptual framework, be deducible or predictable from within the new reducing 
theory” (325). That is, the reduction of certain properties may require the adaptation of new 
theories that solely have the obligation to recognize the existence of properties that mimic the 
causal powers of the reduced properties, not to be predictable. Furthermore, the physics of H2O 
molecules does entail that electromagnetic radiation of “liquid aggregates” will scatter at a 
wavelength that expresses the causal powers of “blueness” at the physical level (Churchland 326).  
 Functionalist arguments, considered to be the most sophisticated arguments of 
antireductionists, consider categories of folk psychology as “fundamentally correct for 
characterizing mental states” and that these categories not only “delimit intentional states and 
logical processes” but also “will not reduce to categories at the neurobiological level of 
description” (Churchland 349). Functionalism is oriented around the thesis that mental states are 
“defined in terms of their abstract causal roles” (Churchland 351). The functionalist theory aligns 
with physicalism in its concession that mental states are implemented at the neurological level. 
Yet functionalists have generally rejected reductionism on the basis that mental states have no 
single unique physical state identical to the type of mental state, but rather have multiple material 
realizations.  
 Churchland suggests that the functionalist view of multiple instantiation incorrectly 
classifies the aim of reductionism. The temperature of gases was found to “reduce to the mean 
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kinetic energy of the constituent molecules,” that is, the temperature of gas is the mean kinetic 
energy of the constituent molecules (356). But as Churchland argues, it was solely the temperature 
of gas that was found to reduce, which demonstrates that “reductions may be reductions relative 
to a domain of phenomena” (357). Thus, the “mere fact that there are differences in hardware has 
no implications whatever for whether the psychology of humans will eventually be explained in 
neuroscientific terms” and “that reductions are domain-relative” does not mean that psychology 
can justify autonomy from neuroscience (Churchland 357). In other words, reductions may be 
distinctive in their particular domains, implying that multiple instantiations or generalizations do 
not need to be reduced in the same manner, like with the example of the temperature of gas.  
 Besides multiple instantiation, another key argument of functionalists relies on the 
“distinction between logical/meaning relations and causal relations” (Churchland 376). According 
to functionalism, mental states have content, are intentional, and “form a semantically coherent 
system, as opposed to a causally interconnected system” (Churchland 377). That is, mental states 
have meaning. Thus, the problem of reduction lies in the intentionality, or meaning, of mental 
states. Mental states are claimed to have intentionality because “categories of psychological theory 
will radically cross-classify the categories of neurobiological theory,” meaning that mental states 
can have distinctive realizers, “and consequently neurophysiological generalizations will miss 
entirely important relations describable only at the level where representations are referred to” 
(Churchland 378). In other words, psychological generalizations cannot be explained with 
neurophysiological explanations.   
 Zenon Pylyshyn presents an example to better understand this claim. Suppose someone 
believes there is a fire in his or her building. This belief is a certain mental representation that can 
be realized in multiple ways. Belief that there is a fire in the building could be realized by smelling 
smoke, seeing flames, feeling a hot doorknob, hearing a fire detector, etc. Given that each of these 
“neurophysiological realizations are distinct, the neurophysiological generalizations will not 
capture what is similar in each of these instances”––that is, that each of these instances correlates 
to the belief that there is a fire in the building (Churchland 379).  
 Churchland attacks the concept that generalizations cannot be explained in “terms of causal 
relations between neurobiological states” (380). In reply to Pylyshyn’s example Churchland 
claims, “If there really is a commonality of psychological state in the heads of all who come to 
believe there is a fire in the building” then it is expected that “at some appropriate level of 
neuropsychological organization, this commonality corresponds to a common neurobiological 
configuration” (381). By the mere existence of a common psychological state among the multiple 
brains of those who believe there is a fire in the building, there must exist such a correlation at the 
neurobiological level as well. Churchland continues by suggesting that the common evolutionary 
history of all brains would imply that “unless the psychological level is indeterministic” (which is 
an unpopular theory among both reductionists and antireductionists), it should be possible to 
explain psychological states neurobiologically (381).  
 Churchland argues that antireductionists are overconfident about the integrity of 
psychology as a reputable science when they state that neuroscience cannot explain generalizations 
of psychology. In other words, psychology should be considered in terms of its conceptual 
usefulness rather than its scientific autonomy. Furthermore, Churchland claims that if no 
explanation of psychological states by neuroscience can be achieved, then this may imply that 
“folk psychology is radically misconceived” (384). 
 
Concluding Remarks 
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 Given the various theories surrounding reductionism and emergence, how then can we 
attempt to define the mind? As has been previously discussed, ontological reductionism is the 
belief that reality is composed of a minimum number of physical kinds of entities and substances, 
and in effect claims that all objects, properties and events are reducible to a physical substance. 
Ontological reductionism may be classified as two distinct forms: token physicalism and type 
physicalism. The latter suggests that every specific scientific type of item can be reduced to similar 
types of items at a lower level complexity. In the instance of the science of psychology, type 
physicalists, like Churchland, claim that mental states are neurophysiological states. I believe that 
type physicalism is too strong of a constraint on science to be considered empirically plausible and 
instead uphold the former classification of ontological reductionism, or token physicalism. In 
contrast to type physicalism, token physicalism holds that every scientific type can be identified 
with some physical type. A token physicalists argues that in the case of psychology, mental states 
correlate to particular physical states, but that the mental and physical states cannot be said to be 
identical.  
 As a token physicalist, I do not believe the theory of ontological emergence, which asserts 
that entirely new and ontologically distinct scientific levels arise, characterized by their unique 
causal forces, and preserve their own laws or regularities. Yet a clear argument may be made for 
the necessity of epistemological emergence. Epistemological emergence validates the autonomy 
of psychology by specifying that analysis and description of a system at the level of a special 
science, like psychology, cannot be reduced to descriptions and analysis at a lower level science, 
like neuroscience. As Fodor suggests, “there are special sciences not because of the nature of our 
epistemic relation to the world, but because of the way the world is put together: not all natural 
kinds are, or correspond to, physical natural kinds” (113). In other words, the generalizations that 
form at the level of our mental states cannot be explained at the neurobiological level. It is my aim 
to demonstrate that Fodor’s argument of generalizations at the level of psychology can be further 
developed to argue for the necessity of epistemological emergence in practice. For the purpose of 
communication and societal representations, psychology is autonomous and therefore, cannot be 
reduced to neurology in practice.  
 Even if we are to concede to the type physicalist and adhere to Churchland’s argument 
that any mental state, like pain for example, is in fact a neurobiological state, this does not deny 
the autonomy of psychology in practice. Suppose we have come to a level of intelligence where 
we completely understand the neurophysiology of the brain. That is, we have complete 
understanding of neuroscience and the neurobiological processes that correlate to all of our mental 
states. If we were to eliminate psychology as an autonomous science and instead solely practice 
neuroscience, this would be impractical. To begin, if we are to take into consideration the argument 
of multiple realization, each individual human would have to learn his or her unique 
neurobiological relations that correspond to each of his or her mental states. For example, given 
complete understanding of neuroscience, I could know that in my specific brain, pain correlates to 
the occurrence of either neural pattern A, neural pattern B, or neural pattern C. While we can begin 
to see the complexity that arises within individual brains, the denial of psychology as an 
autonomous science becomes even more convoluted when considering relations between more 
than one brain. Take for example that my neurobiological correlates of pain, as I have stated earlier, 
are different from Mary’s neurobiological correlates of pain.  How can we then conceive of 
effectively communicating generalizations at the neurobiological level when our mental realizers 
for pain are distinct? 
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Let us first consider the necessity of psychology in practice at the individual level, that is, 
communicative representations of mental states pertaining to one unique brain. If we temporarily 
disregard the argument of multiple realization for simplification purposes, say that in my brain it 
has been proven that when I experience the mental state of anger this correlates to the 
neurophysiological state of the occurrence of neural pattern F. Yet the mental state of anger has 
multiple distinct communicative contexts. For example, anger can be triggered as the result of the 
occurrence of grief, tiredness, pain, humiliation, failure, and even traffic jams or financial 
problems. Each one of these triggers (grief, tiredness, pain, etc.) has a unique neurophysiological 
correlate, and the triggers may be completely unrelated to each other at the neurobiological level. 
Grief may correlate to the neurophysiological state of the occurrence of neural pattern X, while 
tiredness may correlate to the neurophysiological state of the occurrence of neural pattern C. How 
can we then find patterns and generalizations for the mental state of anger at the neurobiological 
level when anger in my brain can have multiple distinct triggers (neural pattern X, neural pattern 
C, etc.) that all result in the occurrence of neural pattern F? It becomes clear that communication 
of these patterns and generalizations requires a level of abstraction that psychology provides as an 
autonomous science.  
Furthermore, there are different gradations of anger, all of which provide a necessary 
function for effective communication. Terms such as enraged, furious, irritated, displeased, etc. 
all reside on a spectrum of the varying degrees of anger. If we were replace any one of these 
gradations of anger with its corresponding neurophysiological state, then there is no guarantee that 
we would still be able to make generalizations about the spectrum of anger as a whole. For 
example, how are we supposed to notice the subtle difference between irritated and displeased if 
their respective neurophysiological correlates are not only distinct, but also seemingly unrelated? 
Thus, communicating at the neurobiological level instead of the psychological level is not a viable 
option if we are to maintain a sufficient level of communication.  
The communicative representations and relations of mental states when discussing more 
than one brain further develops the essentiality of epistemological emergence in practice. Given 
the sophisticated nature of the human race, we have developed certain relationships among 
different mental states that cannot be expressed at the neurophysiological level. As an illustration, 
it is commonly understood that the occurrence of the mental state of anger may lead to the followed 
occurrence of the mental state of remorse. This is an established pattern in our society as a result 
of observation and development of generalizations. Now if we are to assume that the argument of 
multiple realization is true, communication of this particular pattern becomes difficult, if not 
impossible, at the neurobiological level. Suppose that in my brain, anger correlates to the 
occurrence of neural pattern F and remorse correlates to the occurrence of neural pattern G. In 
Mary’s brain, anger correlates to the occurrence of neural pattern X and remorse correlates to the 
occurrence of neural pattern Y. Even with complete knowledge of neuroscience, reducing 
psychology to neurology would forfeit representational communication. If I were to communicate 
to Mary that I had just had the occurrence of neural pattern F followed by the occurrence of neural 
pattern G, this would not only be irrelevant to her specific brain, but would also have no significant 
communicative context. Thus, it seems clear that in the case of both individual and societal 
representations, psychology is fundamentally necessary for effective communication. 
The mind-body problem “has been that of finding a place for the mind in a world that is 
fundamentally and essentially physical” (Kim, “The Mind-Body Problem” 169). If we are to 
consider Fodor’s concept of token physicalism as a foundation for the discussion, mental 
properties require a physical basis. However, given the irreducibility of mental generalizations and 
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the sophistication of our communication, the mind can be argued to be irreducible to the brain in 
practice. Why is it that we are still invested in understanding our mind? Perhaps our investment is 
due to our human nature to search for knowledge and understanding. Or perhaps it is simply 
because the mind-body problem is one of the few phenomena that we may never truly grasp, 
considering our knowledge is and of itself within the scope of the mind. The brain may indeed be 
more complex that it is smart, in which case the mind-body problem will never be resolved. By 
continuing to attempt to define the mind in relation to the body, we advance our understanding of 
the limits of science and perhaps even begin to reach the limits of that which we can understand. 
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 Defining Science 
 
Evan Rapone 
 
It is perhaps a great irony that while science has provided us with an impressive 
advancement in knowledge, we have difficulty understanding and defining science itself. In one 
respect, this could seem unimportant. As long as we continue the effort toward discovery in the 
natural world, why bother defining the term? A lack of a concrete definition does not impede our 
ability to perform scientific investigations. Beyond that, even if one accepts the importance of 
defining the term, why shall we struggle with demarcating it? Why not define science so broadly 
that most learning practices can be considered scientific? Or, why not establish a straightforward 
definition and not question what could be considered science? Let us assume we construct a 
definition that omits thought experiments from being considered scientific. Is there even any point 
in debating its scientific relevance so long as our thought experiment is still revealing and 
informative?  
Contrary to popular belief, there is a reason for defining science as well as understanding 
the scope of that definition. While it is premature to definitively explain why this task is 
significant—mainly because a number of perspectives will be introduced that will consider the 
importance—I understand the necessity for at least a preliminary answer. Defining science is 
important to ensure that the distinction between true science and pseudoscience is clear and 
demarcated.  
Regarding the term “pseudoscience,” it cannot exactly be defined as “not-science,” but 
rather as “almost-science.” Pseudoscience superficially appears to be science, in that it takes into 
account observation, evidence, hypothesizing, etc., yet its underlying methodology lacks 
legitimacy and sound reasoning (Schembri 6). Take, for example, cryptozoology, the study of 
fantasy creatures like Big Foot and the Loch Ness Monster. Cryptozoological researchers make a 
claim that some particular creature exists, gather evidence that supports the claim, and conclude 
with a result that justifies its existence. However, are they really performing science? Not exactly. 
In a general sense, I seek to define science. Such a task will entail a comprehensive review 
and analysis of some significant definitions, considering their benefits and shortcomings. Through 
this discussion, I will also address some related and more fundamental issues regarding the 
difficulty and necessity of defining science. These questions have proven difficult for some of the 
most noted scientific and philosophical thinkers, but perhaps by examining their work in 
comparison to that of others we will be able to arrive at a concrete definition. 
 
Initial Assumptions 
In the introductory paragraph I made the assumption that science deals with the natural 
world and our understanding of it. Perhaps that seems too restrictive of a criterion to begin with, 
but let us consider the magnitude of the natural world. Nature is everything around us. While we 
live in man-made structures and use man-made objects, these are comprised of elements of the 
natural world. In that sense, the concept of the natural world was incorporated to provide clarity 
that science would pertain to everything that physically exists. 
Additionally, the words “understanding” and “knowledge” have been used frequently up 
to this point, which is necessary and has been assumed to be valid. I am sure it is easy to see why 
comprehension is an integral component of science. The mere presence of nature does not validate 
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the existence of science; rather, it is how we observe and explore the natural world that constitutes 
science. Beyond this point, that is as far as we can go in terms of establishing an elementary 
definition for science without beginning to dissect the literature on the topic. Methodology, aim, 
purpose, and scope all appear relevant to include, but perhaps not uniformly. As a result, we cannot 
definitively claim that words such as “hypothesis” or “observation” can be assumed to be in the 
definition. While supposing explanations or witnessing evidence would seem to be characteristic 
of science, we will later see that perhaps science can occur without them. Thus, we shall continue 
with the framework that science has something to do with the natural world and incorporates our 
knowledge. 
 
Godfrey-Smith’s Three Components of Science 
With a skeleton of a definition in place, we can begin to consider more concretely what 
should be encompassed in a discussion of science by examining the work of Peter Godfrey-Smith 
in Theory and Reality: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science. This is not to say that every 
valid definition of the term will incorporate the components he mentions; however, they are 
necessary for understanding definitions of science as well as motivations for defining it. As 
Godfrey-Smith states, there are three recurring themes in attempts to demarcate science: 
empiricism, mathematics, and social structure. Let us examine each of the three and how they 
interact with each other. 
To begin, empiricism is the idea that all of our knowledge can only come from our 
experiences via the senses. The consideration of all knowledge—as opposed to just scientific—
implies that the means by which we acquire general knowledge is exactly the same as the means 
by which we acquire scientific knowledge. Empiricism, though, does not state that they are 
identical. Numerous distinctions between the two exist: scientists work more thoroughly than 
nonscientists to develop greater detail in knowledge, they work more systematically and with 
better organization, and they prioritize connecting the knowledge to other aspects of the natural 
world.  
The next component involved in the discussion of science is mathematics. Considering the 
breadth of what the discussion would entail, I seek not to define mathematics here, but rather to 
acknowledge the role it plays in science. For example, mathematics can be used to derive equations 
that we use to describe nature or it can be considered a useful fiction that, while it may not be used 
as direct support for a scientific claim, can be utilized to assemble our understanding of the natural 
world into a working model. Either way, mathematics can certainly be used to reveal something 
about nature. 
Finally, social structure plays a pertinent role in discussing science. While significant 
experimentation and inquiry takes place on the individual or local level, science tends to 
incorporate a network of communication between scientists. Most, if not all, fundamental scientific 
discovery requires some form of collaboration and confidence in the work of other scientists. No 
singular person can possess such a complete enough understanding of the natural world that he or 
she can progress through scientific research in the absence of verification from peers.  
Reflecting on Godfrey-Smith’s components, I imagine there is a sense of confusion in the 
specifications of the elements, mostly because they appear to contradict each other at times. For 
example, how can empiricism and mathematics coexist in a logical definition of science? 
Empiricism states that only our senses provide true knowledge while a consideration of 
mathematics would imply that our experiences are only one form of gaining knowledge. 
Additionally, how can empiricism cooperate with social structure? Social structure by definition 
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incorporates a level of trust in others whereas empiricism would reject that basis for understanding. 
That is not to say that an empiricist is cynical, but that perhaps social structures ought to be 
questioned. Furthermore, how is empiricism feasibly possible? Individuals cannot directly 
experience everything about science. In that sense, empiricism could be valid, but only on a small 
scale. For example, if I drop a ball, I see it fall to the ground and, based on my own experience, 
can state that some sort of attraction exists. On that basis, at the local level, I am correct. But that 
is not a complete enough picture. What my experience does not tell me is that any objects can have 
a gravitational force between them and both move to meet each other. I do not witness the Earth 
moving closer to the ball as the object falls, but does that mean it is not happening? An empiricist 
would argue yes, while an individual who prioritizes social structures or mathematics might argue 
no. But, in the same light, is it naïve to believe something that cannot be witnessed? The formula 
for gravitational attraction is clear and concise but might do little to convince someone of the 
existence of physical attraction between objects. Likewise, my professors can teach that all objects 
produce some sort of gravitational force, but if they cannot provide a demonstration I am only 
accepting their word.  
Contrarily, there are plenty of ways in which these components can effectively combine to 
present a definition of science. Mathematics, when taken as a useful fiction, can be used to validate 
that the experiences of an individual are not a fluke or sporadic. Likewise, social structures can 
combine with empiricism to allow individuals to conduct various experiments on their own and 
then collaborate to analyze results. In any case, the three themes involved in defining science will 
appear in various ways and, in order to understand the logic behind the definitions, it is vital to 
comprehend the varied manner in which the components will appear and affect our interpretation 
of science. The contradictions and intermingling of these three core components will help discern 
one definition from another.  
 
Logical Positivist Approach 
The first definition of science to discuss is one that a logical positivist would put forward. 
Logical positivism, otherwise known as logical empiricism, is difficult to confine to a concrete 
definition but can be taken as a form of empiricism that prioritizes experimental evidence. A 
central basis for this perspective is that the meaning of a statement is its method of verification 
(Schlick et al. 201). Coinciding with these views is a theory of language that covers two primary 
ideas, the analytic-synthetic distinction and the verifiability theory of meaning (Godfrey-Smith 
25). The analytic-synthetic distinction, presented by Kant, discusses the dichotomy between 
analytic statements that are true or false based on meaning and synthetic statements that are true 
or false based on meaning and reality. An example should clarify the difference. “A square has 
four sides” is analytic because it will always be true. Alternatively, “I drew a square” is synthetic 
because its truth requires that I drew one. The other concept, the verifiability theory of meaning, 
relates directly to the central notion that meaningful statements require verifiability (Godfrey-
Smith 27). 
We now possess the framework for thinking in the realm of logical positivism and an 
understanding of the approach to science advocated by the movement. As discussed, logical 
positivism relies heavily on experience, however, logical positivists would feel comfortable 
involving mathematics in their definition due to the analytic-synthetic distinction. While they 
would not accept mathematics as a source of knowledge, they could easily classify it as analytic 
with the implication that the reality of the natural world is irrelevant to the validity of the statement 
(Rey). Thus, we can utilize mathematics in synthetic statements when applicable, for example by 
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claiming that the applied force on an object is equivalent to its mass multiplied by the resulting 
acceleration. The mathematics itself means nothing in terms of the natural phenomenon, but we 
can use the language of mathematics to describe what we believe to be true. 
While logical positivism does not tend to incorporate the idea of social structure, it does 
present a significant stipulation for defining science. To define science by the standards of a logical 
positivist, the idea of verification, particularly based on observation, is vital. The term 
“verification” is used to denote that any sort of scientific claim can be tested and determined as 
true or false via observation. This is not to say that the experimentation has to always be verified 
in practice—that could be immensely difficult—but that the theory can be confirmed or denied 
(Godfrey-Smith 27). 
With the basis of how a logical positivist would approach science, we can begin to 
understand a potential definition for it: 
 
The process of making falsifiable predictions about the natural world based on past 
experiences. 
 
Verification implies prediction; if one can reproduce an experiment, then one should expect to see 
similar outcomes. The quest for predictability is precisely what every scientist should pursue 
(Godfrey-Smith 29). Additionally, the term “falsifiability” has been added for concision since 
verification to a logical positivist implies that something can be wrong, but this is discussed in 
greater detail below. 
Thus, we have our first concrete definition of science. Before moving to another we shall 
dissect this one and look for potential flaws. First, the prioritization of predictability, while 
important, limits the definition. Predictability implies the previous existence of something, which 
implies that the logical positivist definition of science would seem to ignore the possibility of new 
discoveries. As Godfrey-Smith states, the theorizing of hidden structures in the natural world is a 
core part of what most people consider to be scientific (36). The logical positivist definition does 
not account for that discovery. Any statement hypothesizing something in the natural world that 
may not exist would have no meaning according to logical positivism: it surely is not analytic, and 
would only be considered synthetic if we could observe it, implying we would have no issue if that 
were true.  
Alternatively, for any observable experiment, the idea of verifiability comes into question 
when considering the reality of our natural world. The idea of verification is idealistic; it does not 
consider the whole environment of an experiment and only prioritizes confirming or denying the 
claim itself. Thus, it implies isolation, which is not possible in the real world. Assumptions are 
required to be able to test claims, but if a claim fails, one cannot immediately verify whether the 
claim itself is wrong or an assumption has caused the experiment to fail (Rey). As a result, we see 
that the definition of science from a logical positivist stance has merit and encompasses critical 
ideas of predictability and falsifiability, but it appears overly idealistic. 
 
Hypothetico-Deductivist Approach 
We shall now consider another perspective on science, that of a hypothetico-deductivist. 
Hypothetico-deductivism is the belief in a compact scientific method, similar to those taught in 
elementary science courses. While these procedures can vary greatly across fields, a general notion 
of the method involves hypothesizing about some aspect of nature, determining new observational 
predictions based on the hypothesis, and verifying the predictions are valid. In a more condensed 
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view, hypothetico-deductivism is “the idea…that a hypothesis is confirmed when it can be used to 
derive true observational predictions” (Godfrey-Smith 236). This perspective works well after 
discussing logical positivism as it builds on the idea of falsifiability, which we have already 
designated as valid, but also reconsiders the notion of predictability. We will define the concept of 
“prediction” in contrast to “predictability” because—since we are not in the scope of empiricism—
the terms will take on alternative meanings. 
While the distinction between “prediction” and “predictability” might seem like a semantic 
issue, I believe highlighting the contrast is necessary. A logical positivist’s concept of 
“predictability” implies repeatedly performing the same experiment and expecting the same result. 
A hypothetico-deductivist’s concept of “prediction” relies on theorizing and hypothesizing. When 
put more simply the difference is clear, predictability requires previous experience and prediction 
does not (Ehrenberg et al. 191). In effect, we are justified in continuing with our rejection of 
predictability in favor of prediction, a key component to any discussion of the scientific method. 
As with the previous perspective, let us now establish legitimacy for the hypothetico-
deductivist viewpoint prior to examining a potential definition for it. While the case can be made 
for the scientific method in the context of longevity—the procedure has been taught for quite some 
time to aspiring scientists of all fields—we shall focus on more substantive arguments. In his 
article, “The Fixation of Belief,” Charles S. Peirce examines numerous benefits of the scientific 
method with one of the most prominent ones being the efficient progression from the known to the 
unknown. Unlike logical positivism, hypothetico-deductivism includes references to hidden 
structures and other natural concepts of which we may not be familiar. The scientific method 
provides for a logical transition in which we hypothesize an unknown concept or natural 
phenomena based on what we believe we know. We can consider Peirce’s notion of abduction to 
clarify this concept. The abductive type of logical reasoning allows for an individual to make sense 
of an observation by guessing a theory that could account for it. While the process of abductive 
reasoning appears to be reverse deductive reasoning, it is important to distinguish it from 
deduction. Abducing an explanation for an observation does not mean that it guarantees the 
observation. Rather, abduction works as a starting point to introduce new ideas (Frankfurt 597). 
Furthermore, Peirce explains that the use of the scientific method eliminates bias or other 
external influences on scientists (11). With a designated protocol to follow, scientists will display 
uniformity and consistency in their investigations. Summarized by Peirce, the scientific method 
allows us to discover: 
 
Real things, whose characters are entirely independent of our opinions about them; 
those Reals affect our senses according to regular laws, and, though our sensations 
are as different as are our relations to the objects, yet, by taking advantage of the 
laws of perception, we can ascertain by reasoning how things really and truly are; 
and any man, if he have sufficient experience and he reason enough about it, will 
be led to the one True conclusion. (10) 
 
Peirce acknowledges that, in contrast to empiricism, we can hold beliefs that lack experimental 
basis, which could allow for discord among scientific communities over certain phenomena. 
However, effectively employing the scientific method will lead us to a better understanding of 
reality, which we can then compare to our opinions. Therefore, we can maintain confidence when 
utilizing the scientific method since it shall be crucial in ensuring our beliefs coincide with our 
understanding of nature. To quote Peirce, “no doubts of the method…arise from its practice” (10). 
Evan Rapone 
17 
 
Given the basis for using a general scientific method, let us look more broadly at what a 
hypothetico-deductivist believes. As implied by the scientific method, hypothetico-deductivism 
considers falsification and logical reasoning. Hypothetico-deductivism also works as a 
compromise between empiricism, which I have discussed, and theorization, which I will discuss. 
Theory prompts the creation of a hypothesis and experimental evidence ensures the validity of 
one, resulting in a symbiotic relationship between two concepts that can be treated as wholly 
different. Additionally, a more subtle point about this approach, hypothetico-deductivism includes 
a dismissal of pseudoscience, which was originally noted as a problem in the introduction. Any 
type of hypothesis could be created (e.g. “God exists”), but without a scientific means of testing 
the hypothesis the scientific method could not be used and thus the theory would not be considered 
scientific. Considering all of this, we can construct a possible definition of science for the 
hypothetico-deductivism approach: 
 
The methodological process of creating a testable hypothesis about nature, 
performing experiments based on the hypothesis, and evaluating data and 
observation to understand the validity of the hypothesis. 
 
Not surprisingly, the definition is derived from the notion of the scientific method. 
Let us now scrutinize this definition. To begin, while the hypothetico-deductivist approach 
attempts to account for bias, there are two ways in which it falters. First, Peirce assumes that 
scientists will immediately denounce any opinion that contradicts experimental evidence. 
Contrarily, the complete rejection of observation in favor of a yet-to-be-proven theory occurs with 
some frequency and can also lead to more accurate theories. Second, humans are susceptible to 
subconscious bias; even if the scientific method was completely valid in its current form, it could 
never entirely be accepted because those who perform the procedure, humans, are imperfect and 
have individual beliefs and preferences (Baumgardner). If we consider the concept of the 
procedure itself, the scientific method is highly idealistic. The belief that all science exists in 
clearly defined, multistep processes misrepresents the complexity of the processes involved and 
creates an unrealistic standard (Blachowicz 306). Scientific research is unpredictable, creative, and 
revisionary, despite the fact that the scientific method implies that it is rigid, directed, and one-
dimensional. 
Apart from this criticism, perhaps we should not entirely dismiss the scientific method. 
While the adherence to a rigid procedure of scientific discovery skews the general investigation of 
nature, the foundation of the method—critical thinking and analysis—has merit and should be 
considered. What the scientific method does aid with is providing a means by which we think and 
approach problems (Bauer 149). The specifics of these types of analyses varies across fields, but 
the general pursuit of knowledge promoted by the scientific method will be integral to our 
consideration of a definition.  
 
Theorist Approach 
As described by Henry Bauer in his Scientific Literacy and the Myth of the Scientific 
Method, a prioritization of theory is essentially the opposite of the logical positivist approach (25). 
For theorists, theories can be postulated and supported by logical calculations; thus, 
experimentation is only useful insofar as it agrees with the accepted theory. As such, it could be 
acceptable to reject experimental outcomes in favor of, for example, a mathematical method. 
Certainly, in the context of our previous perspectives, this concept seems contradictory to the 
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notion of science we have been discussing. Perhaps, we should consider the implications of 
theorizing in science.  
As mentioned earlier, Godfrey-Smith presents the notion of hidden structures that we could 
not otherwise perceive without first predicting that they exist. Let us look at an example to see the 
applicability of this concept. Recently scientists detected gravitational waves, which had been 
theorized by Einstein in his theory of general relativity roughly one hundred years before their 
discovery. As our understanding of the universe has expanded over time, the concept of 
gravitational waves was accepted as true based on calculations, but up until recently we lacked 
actual observation of them. Armed with evidence, scientists can definitively claim that Einstein’s 
theory is correct and that the tendency to accept the concept of gravitational waves in fields such 
as astrophysics was justified based on the accuracy of the calculations. 
We can take the argument in favor of theorizing even further. Consider, for example, the 
work of Bas van Fraassen in The Scientific Image. Without diverging too much into his discussion 
of whether science is true or can be accepted as empirically adequate, van Fraassen presents the 
notion of constructive empiricism in which scientists should only use theories to explain the 
observable aspects of the world (12). While it is entirely possible that unobservable realities could 
also be addressed by the theory, such an interest is not scientific. Therefore, scientists would accept 
theories only if they are empirically adequate. As such, van Fraassen’s description of constructive 
empiricism would not include the theorizing of hidden structures as legitimate science.  
There are two primary reasons why this notion is incorrect. First, if we consider 
observability in general, we need to distinguish between “detectable” and “observable.” The 
former would be true for an atom while the latter would be true for the page on which these words 
appear. While both imply observation, detectability could refer to an image of something being 
observed. Take an atom as an example. When using an electron microscope, we are not observing 
the atom itself but rather an image of it. While we feel confident in our observation of the image, 
we need to acknowledge that we cannot observe that something is an atom (Contessa 465). Thus, 
the vague treatment of observability in van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism does not account 
for this distinction. Also, recalling the discussion of isolation, we need to acknowledge that the 
belief that only one thing is observable does not make sense; if we consider something observable, 
it requires that all properties associated with it are observable as well, which almost never happens 
(Contessa 467). To clarify this, let us consider the universe. We believe in the existence of the 
Earth, the Moon, the Sun, etc. but are we not to believe in distant stars that are presently 
unobservable? Constructive empiricists would consider the belief in these stars to be as valid as 
the belief in atoms, which is problematic. For these reasons, we can state that van Fraassen’s notion 
of constructive empiricism does not provide an adequate rationale for relying on observability. 
Furthermore, the simplification of the observable versus unobservable dynamic implied by 
constructive empiricism could sporadically change as other new discoveries are made; what we 
consider unobservable today might be observable tomorrow. We would not be as confident with 
our knowledge of the unobservable as we would be with the observable—which is a completely 
valid point made by van Fraassen—but there is not sufficient justification for entirely dismissing 
the scientific nature of exploring hidden structures: 
 
As we learn about the world, we also learn more and more about which parts of the 
world we can expect to have reliable information about. And there is no reason why 
science should not try to describe all the aspects of the world that we can hope to 
gain reliable information about. As we move from one area to another, we must 
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often adjust our level of confidence. Sometimes, especially in areas such as 
theoretical physics, which are fraught with strange puzzles, we might have reason 
to adopt something like van Fraassen’s attitude, at least temporarily. But it is a 
mistake to think that empirical adequacy of van Fraassen’s kind is the aim of 
science. (Godfrey-Smith 186) 
 
Reflecting on the previous discussions, we can now confidently discuss definitions of science in 
the context of a theorist’s beliefs.  
 Considering how a theorist would approach science, we can state that an example definition 
from the field would be: 
 
The process of understanding the natural world around us; while experimentation 
and observation may agree with developed theories, they are not required. 
 
Probably the most striking aspect of the definition is that it sounds glaringly similar to that of 
philosophy. While mathematics or logic might agree with a given theory, a lack of physical 
verification does seem difficult to accept. We can turn to the work of Thomas Kuhn to potentially 
solve this problem. Kuhn presented the idea of a paradigm that contains all of the accepted theories, 
concepts, practices, instruments, etc. of a particular subject in science (11). While theories are only 
part of a paradigm, we can use Kuhn’s description of paradigm shifts to rationalize the sample 
theorist’s definition. According to Kuhn, paradigms can exist and be supported even if observation 
does not necessarily confirm them. In the event that these anomalies—the discrepancies in 
experimentation and paradigms—begin to accumulate, scientists have no other option but to 
replace the previously held paradigm with one that more accurately represents our knowledge of 
the natural world (53). For our case, we can use Kuhn’s concept to explain the theorist’s definition. 
The fact that experimentation and observation are not required coincides with Kuhn’s belief that 
we should universally accept the given paradigm. However, if abundant observation rejects the 
paradigm we support, we can dismiss it on the basis that the theory would no longer be valid. Thus, 
since the theorist’s definition prioritizes knowledge and understanding, we do not need to utilize 
observation to confirm scientific theories, only to reject them. For that matter, the theorist’s 
definition seems to describe science in a general sense and cleverly refute any oppositions or 
rejections. 
 As with the previous perspectives, we will now critique the definition and analyze its 
shortcomings. Clearly, our concept of science should require some sort of evidence-based 
verification. To entirely detach our definition of science from the experiences of the natural world 
is disingenuous because it is precisely the functioning of the natural world about which we are 
concerned. In our constructed definition, we consider the process of understanding nature, but 
could we not incorrectly interpret a natural phenomenon? Understanding does not imply accuracy 
but rather thoroughness. We need not look far to discover numerous scientific beliefs that we 
initially accepted and now believe are incorrect: the concept of the luminiferous aether propagating 
light waves, the belief in a geocentric universe, and the infamous cold fusion fallacy. While not 
delving too far into considerations regarding the limits of knowledge, we can be assured that our 
understanding of the universe and its actual functioning are not always the same. As such, we 
cannot use a definition of science that is based purely on theory; we require some sort of 
verification to ensure that we are as representative of nature as possible. I must acknowledge that 
we can still be wrong even with experimental verification since human error or measurement 
Evan Rapone 
20 
 
limitation can prevent us from truly understanding the universe. Science is a human practice, after 
all. With that considered, the theorist perspective extends too far into philosophy without 
accounting for at least some sort of evidence. 
 Having discussed the necessity of verification, we do not need to demarcate a specific type 
of evidence. Although an empiricist would disagree, the testing of hypotheses can involve 
numerous different methods. Perhaps a particular theory agrees with a mathematical model or 
perhaps we have experimental evidence confirming a given theory. Either way, both of these 
examples of verification could serve as evidence of a theory’s accuracy and we need not 
specifically choose one. Take mathematics as an example: while complex mathematical models 
might be useful in physics to describe the laws of nature, in areas such as biology and geology, we 
typically look elsewhere for evidence and use mathematics for more general arithmetic (Bauer 25). 
Specifically, a prominent example of non-experimental based verification of a generally accepted 
model would be quantum mechanics. While we could be entirely wrong about the concept, the 
model works well with what we know about the natural world. Some of the components of 
quantum theory seem almost ludicrous at times—most notably the idea that everything with 
momentum is made up of wave packets—but we still have no better model to explain the natural 
world. In this regard, we see that the lack of evidence in the theorist’s definition is problematic, 
but by considering the ambiguity of verification, we can still build on the definition. 
 
A Definition of Science 
 We have now completed an analysis of our three different approaches: logical positivism, 
hypothetico-deductivism, and theorization. These perspectives were deliberately chosen since they 
all lie on the same continuum of what most scientists tend to prioritize. Logical positivism is at 
one end with a strict reliance on experimentation while theorization lies at the other end with a 
prioritization of hypothesizing. Hypothetico-deductivism was not added to amend the perspectives 
but rather to show how theory and experimentation can effectively work in the same approach. At 
this point, we can now put forth our own definition of science which takes into account all of the 
components we highlighted in each of the three perspectives: 
 
The process of understanding the natural world by means of analyzing falsifiable 
hypotheses that correlate to some form of evidence. 
 
I will defend this definition by reviewing it as a whole as opposed to by considering individual 
components to avoid redundancy. 
As stated in the introduction, we assumed that a basic definition of science would involve 
what humans know about nature. For that reason, I included “understanding” as opposed to 
“knowledge” of nature since the connotation of the latter seems too definite and does not accurately 
reflect the potential to be wrong. I also believe the definition best blends the merit of the scientific 
method with the validity of theorizing and necessity for verification. The analysis of falsifiable 
hypotheses is not a process, but rather a starting point for critical thinking, which we saw as the 
greatest result of hypothetico-deductivism. Furthermore, by prioritizing hypothesizing in the 
definition, we establish that theorizing, thought-experiments, and critical evaluations of nature are 
integral aspects of science—which eliminates the biggest deficiency of requiring empirical 
evidence in logical positivism. With that stated, we still need these hypotheses to be based on some 
form of evidence, not only to coincide with the scientific method, but also to still include 
empiricism. Evidence could be observation-based on experimentation, but it is not required to be 
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as such. In this sense, I have considered not only the implications of each of the three perspectives, 
but also how to combat the most severe drawbacks of each. 
 I conclude by considering some of the implications of this definition. We have effectively 
omitted any confusion between pseudoscience and science. If a concept cannot provide for a 
meaningful and testable hypothesis, it need not be considered scientific. Furthermore, we have 
accurately described ambiguous fields such as astronomy as scientific. While most individuals 
would consider astronomy to be science, we saw that many perspectives struggled to include it as 
scientific. As such, astronomy, and any other field that does not exclusively rely on 
experimentation, is rightfully included. We have also effectively excluded other fields that have 
been considered scientific at times, namely social sciences. Although they pertain to the natural 
world (e.g. history), social sciences tend not to include meaningful, falsifiable predictions. With 
that considered, certain fields such as economics and psychology present trickier cases in which 
the definition may be upheld, but the fields are not completely recognized as truly scientific. For 
example, the notion of the “natural world” in the context of economics is ambiguous. In one case, 
we might take everything as nature, while in the other, we might exclude man-made institutions 
that rely on our actions. Perhaps the discrepancies in the cases of economics or psychology are not 
based on how we define science, but rather how we perceive the individual fields. For that matter, 
we might always experience some gray area when attempting to define science. Regardless, we 
have arrived at a comprehensive definition. 
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 Theoretical Reason: Knowledge and its Limits in Immanuel Kant’s 
Critique of Pure Reason 
 
Madeleine Scott 
 
Introduction 
 Many scientific studies today attempt to outline the exact system of the human brain as it 
processes information and turns this information into knowledge. However, parallel to science, 
and based on philosophical thought and argumentation rather than research on neurological 
processes, there exist conceptions of thought through the dual lenses of practical and theoretical 
reason. Within theoretical reason, Immanuel Kant and his seminal work Critique of Pure Reason 
are integral to understanding of knowledge and its limits. In what follows I will examine Critique 
of Pure Reason, as well as critical readings from W.V.O. Quine and Graham Priest, to explore the 
extent of the limits of thought. 
 
Historical Context: Rationalism vs. Empiricism 
 To understand Kant’s account of theoretical reason, it is necessary to examine first its 
philosophical background. The pre-Kantian world of the 17th and 18th centuries, known as the 
Early Modern Period, contained two major schools of thought within epistemology, the “branch 
of philosophy devoted to the study of the nature, sources, and limits of knowledge”—both of which 
sought to answer the subject’s question of how we gain knowledge (Markie).  
 The first, rationalism, is based on the claim that knowledge is derived from reason in and 
of itself, independently of sense experience. Rationalism draws from the collective work of the 
Continental Rationalists, most notably Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz; and the acceptance of at 
least one of three theses: Induction/Deduction, Innate Knowledge, and Innate Concept. All of these 
are dependent on a variable subject area, hereafter known as S.  
 
Induction/Deduction Thesis: Some propositions in S are able to be known through intuition, 
while some are able to be known through deduction from intuited propositions.  
 
Innate Knowledge Thesis: We have knowledge of some truths in S as part of our rational 
nature. 
 
Innate Concept Thesis: We have knowledge of some concepts in S as part of our rational 
nature; that is, we have concepts inside of us that are brought to light by experience. 
 
Rationalism also contains two more theses of note—and though acceptance of either of 
these is not required to be considered a rationalist, they do broaden the perspective’s notions and 
stance against empiricism.  
 
Indispensability of Reason Thesis: The knowledge we gain in S, whether through 
induction/deduction or through innate knowledge, cannot be gained through experience. In 
the same way, experience cannot provide what we gain through reason.  
 
Superiority of Reason Thesis: Reason is superior to experience as the source of knowledge.  
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These theses, admittedly, seem to be conclusions unsupported by strong premises, and 
almost—dare I say—redundant. If reason is superior, why and how is that the case? Descartes 
claims that what we know from innate reason is certain, while what we know from experience is 
at least somewhat uncertain. This is grounded in Plato’s perhaps more controversial claim that 
what we know from reason alone is in and of itself superior, because what we know from reason 
often exists on a more fundamental, universal plane within the context of metaphysics—though I 
won’t delve into metaphysics quite yet. 
 Empiricism, on the other hand, is the claim that knowledge is derived ultimately from sense 
experience, and sense experience alone. It is based on the work of the British empiricists, most 
notably Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. Whereas rationalism draws from several theories, empiricism 
relies on one.  
 
Empiricism Thesis: Only sense experience is the source of knowledge in, and for concepts 
used in, S.   
 
However, in the same way that within rationalism there exist two theses directly to contrast 
with empiricism, empiricism asserts rejection of the Induction/Deduction and Innate Knowledge 
theses. Ultimately, empiricism, having no inherent connection to that which is considered 
empirical information, argues that on one hand, if knowledge can be gained, it is by experience; 
and on the other, if experience cannot and does not give us knowledge, we have no knowledge and 
know nothing. 
Many today maintain that rationalism and empiricism can and even should be relativized, 
with each applying to different subjects. So it is interesting that often in examination of this 
historical context, key philosophers tend to be categorized as staunchly on one side of the debate, 
when that was not the case. John Locke, for example, a British empiricist, was known to adopt the 
Induction/Deduction thesis of rationalism with regards to knowledge of the existence of God 
(Markie).  
Kant is notable, perhaps even revolutionary, for delineating and then synthesizing the role 
of reason in the two previously discussed schools of thought—critiquing both the “unprovable 
pretensions of reason in earlier ‘rationalist’ philosophers” and the “subservient role accorded to 
reason by the British empiricists” (Williams).  The following section will discuss how Kant came 
to accomplish this synthesis, through his account of experience interpretation and thereby the 
acquisition of knowledge. 
 
How We Understand the World Around Us 
It seems near impossible to have a conversation about rationalism vs. empiricism, and 
therefore theoretical reason, without using the terms a priori and a posteriori—popularized by 
Kant, they are applied in retrospect to early works because of their definitive nature. As defined in 
Critique of Pure Reason, knowledge a priori, more aligned with rationalism, is that which is 
“altogether independent of experience”—to the point of not being “independent of this or that kind 
of experience, but…. absolutely so of all experience.” In the same way, knowledge a posteriori, 
more aligned with empiricism, is that which is known after any kind of experience.  
Kant’s next key distinction is between analytic and synthetic knowledge. Analytic 
judgments are “those in which the connection of the predicate with the subject is cogitated through 
identity”—i.e., the predicate is contained by the subject—whereas synthetic judgments are “those 
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in which [the connection of the predicate with the subject] is cogitated without identity”—i.e., the 
predicate is not contained by the subject. The analytic-synthetic distinction is one of the most 
crucial concepts of modern empiricism, becoming so far engrained in its tenets that Willard Van 
Orman Quine christened this distinction one of the “two dogmas” of modern empiricism. To 
understand Kant’s conception of theoretical reason, we must fully understand the analytic-
synthetic distinction. 
First and foremost, to follow the Kantian definition we must understand the meaning of 
subject and predicate beyond how these terms are colloquially conceptualized. Kant falls in line 
with the tradition of Aristotelianism, designating the subject as “‘that which lies under,’” necessary 
to speak logically of “that of which things are predicated,” and/or to designate matter. He accepts 
Descartes’ notion that the ultimate subject is the self-conscious I, the idea that “I think therefore I 
am,” but does not grant that this I truly exists; rather, it is a logical function. This is the important 
distinction between the subject and the acting subject referred to in the antinomies, which itself is 
a substance; however, though notable, the acting subject is not relevant quite yet and as such will 
not be further discussed in this section. It follows then that predicate is that which logically 
combines with subject—and this relationship is determined by the structure of either the analytic 
or the synthetic, as defined above (Caygill).  
These dictionary definitions, while helpful, are based on a historical chain of philosophies 
and do not easily allow us to examine critically all aspects of the distinction—so here I turn to 
Quine and his seminal work, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism.” Before entering into summary and 
analysis of this text, it is important to note that Quine’s position is to defeat both dogmas, and this 
includes defeating the analytic-synthetic distinction. However, examining his process of 
argumentation illuminates what the distinction intends to accomplish, and that in and of itself 
carries importance. 
 
Exegesis of W.V.O. Quine’s “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” 
After establishing what he believes to be the two dogmas (the existence of the analytic-
synthetic distinction and the truth of reductionism, the latter of which will not be explored) Quine 
begins with his critique of analyticity. According to Quine, background for the distinction can be 
found in the work of both Hume and Leibniz. Hume established a distinction between relations of 
ideas and matters of fact, while Leibniz established one between truths of fact and truths of all 
reason, truths that are “true in all possible worlds”—which is to say that they “could not possibly 
be false.” Similar to this is the idea that analytic statements are those whose “denials are self-
contradictory,” however, this definition is already flawed, in that its notion of “self-
contradictoriness” needs just as much clarification as that of analyticity itself. 
Quine then restates Kant’s definition of the analytic statement as “one that attributes to its 
subject no more than is already conceptually contained in its subject,” interestingly removing from 
this the potential complication of the word “predicate” as originally used by Kant. He proceeds to 
argue against this definition, bringing up two shortcomings: that it limits itself to subject-predicate 
form, and relies on the idea of containment at a metaphorical level. Because of these shortcomings, 
Quine believes, Kant’s intent is more based on his notion of analyticity than his definition, more 
properly phrased as that “a statement is analytic when it is true by virtue of meanings and 
independently of fact.” 
If this notion is the case, though, an examination of the concept of meaning is in order. 
Here Quine creates the important delineation that meaning is not the same as naming—terms can 
“name the same thing, but differ in meaning.” This applies to both the singular term, which 
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“purports to name an entity,” and the general term, which does not purport to name an entity but 
is “true of an entity, or of each of many, or of none.” When there is a general term, there also exists 
the extension of this term, which Quine defines as the “class of all entities of which the general 
term is true.” To clarify—in meaning there are two contrasts, between meaning of a singular term 
and the entity that it names, and between meaning of a general term and its extension.  
  Quine also gives historical context, arguing that the modern notion of meaning, or 
intension, is based on the Aristotelian notion of essence. According to this, things have essences, 
but only linguistic forms carry meaning—and that meaning is “what essence becomes when it is 
divorced from the object of reference and wedded to the word.” If we accept this, we must ask the 
inevitable—what sort of things, then, are meanings? However, this question is dependent on a “felt 
need for meant entities,” which Quine argues is derived from an earlier failure to distinguish 
between meaning and reference. Once we make this distinction, we can understand that the theory 
of meaning only needs to concern the “synonymy of linguistic forms and the analyticity of 
statements”—that meanings themselves are beside the point.  
 Quine’s initial description of analyticity is based on its concept of meaning, but he 
concludes that, as he has shown through deconstruction, “meaning” can be abandoned—however, 
the issue of analyticity still remains. Here, Quine puts forth the two classes of analytic statements, 
which inform the argumentation of the rest of the paper.  
 The first class is comprised of those statements which can be called logically true, such as 
the statement: 
 
(1) No unmarried man is married. 
 
This example stands because it is not just true as is—it is true under “any and all reinterpretations 
of ‘man’ and ‘married’.” Accepting this means that, in general, we can understand a logical truth 
as a statement which is “true and remains true under all reinterpretations of its components,” aside 
from so-called logical particles such as “no,” “un-,” and “if…then.” Logical truths, then, are 
relatively straightforward, and we question why such a big fuss is made over analyticity until we 
turn to the second class of analytic statements:  
 
(2) No bachelor is married. 
 
Such a statement is characterized by the fact that it can be turned into a logical truth by replacing 
synonyms with synonyms—in this case, (2) becomes (1) by replacing “bachelor” with its synonym 
“unmarried man.” While this characterization is somewhat acceptable, it brings up a need to clarify 
the notion of “synonymy,” as on this the second class of statements is dependent, and in turn, on 
this second class is analyticity itself dependent. 
 Quine begins his attempt to begin clarification of synonymy with an analysis of the concept 
of definition. It can seem adequate to say that second class analytic statements are essentially 
logical truths by definition, as, for example, “bachelor” is defined as “unmarried man.” However, 
Quine challenges this notion—who makes this definition? When? How? Definition is dependent 
on antecedent facts. How then, can we affirm synonymy without depending on antecedent? It 
seems to Quine that these interconnections have to be grounded in usage, or, perhaps, what 
philosopher Rudolf Carnap calls explication. Explication does not intend to merely paraphrase the 
definiendum (what is being defined) into an “outright synonym,” but to improve the definiendum. 
However, even this still rests on pre-existing synonymies, as any word “worth explicating” has 
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some contexts in which usage is useful, and explication must both maintain usage in this original 
contexts while sharpening usage in new contexts.  As such, Quine concludes, definition is 
dependent on prior relationships of synonymy, and therefore does not “hold the key” to synonymy 
and therefore analyticity. 
 Next, Quine turns to interchangeability, as it seems natural to assume that synonymy 
consists solely of interchangeability of two linguistic forms “in all contexts without change of truth 
value,” or interchangeability salva veritate, as labeled by Leibniz. However, following this notion, 
the synonyms “bachelor” and “unmarried man” are not everywhere interchangeable salva veritate. 
Quine puts forth several examples that can only be described as silly in their obviousness, such as 
the logical inability to substitute “unmarried man” for “bachelor” in the term “bachelor of arts.” 
Based on these, interchangeability salva veritate is inadequate, and so Quine examines what can 
be called cognitive synonymy. Referring back to the reoccurring example: if “bachelor” and 
unmarried man” are cognitively synonymous, then the statement 
 
(3) All and only bachelors are unmarried men 
 
is analytic.  
 What is necessary then is “cognitive synonymy not presupposing analyticity”—and this is, 
in concept, interchangeability salva veritate. However, this is a sort of circular argument, and 
Quine’s arguments regarding both interchangeability salva veritate and cognitive synonymy, their 
relationship to each other, and their derivation of and from analyticity ultimate conclude with a 
decision to abandon both, in doing so abandoning the idea of interchangeability at all entirely. 
 The third and final concept Quine considers in trying to understand synonymy is that of 
semantical rules, but this becomes dependent on a concept of artificial language, and again, 
becomes an argument Quine sets up for himself solely to defeat. While it can seem Quine’s 
reasoning is circular, he is in fact critiquing and defeating common methods of setting up the 
distinction, and we are left to accept that the boundary between analytic and synthetic has not been, 
and cannot be drawn. 
 
The Intersection of Kant’s Two Distinctions 
To continue this understanding of Kant, we must only draw from Quine his logical 
processes in addressing both analytic and synthetic, and uphold belief of the distinction. Here we 
come to an intersection of these two key distinctions, analytic versus synthetic and a priori versus 
a posteriori. In this intersection subjects (the S’s of section one’s theses) are able to be categorized, 
as is best understood through visualization—thus, the following chart.  
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 ANALYTIC SYNTHETIC 
A PRIORI • X=X 
• A bachelor is a male 
• A square is a rectangle 
• Metaphysics 
A 
POSTERIORI 
• Not applicable • Sciences 
• This rectangle is a square 
 
The overlap of analytic and a priori knowledge focuses on propositions exemplified by 
mathematics’ reflexive property of equality—for example, X=X. These concepts are inherently 
definitive, and as such, typically do not require higher-order discourse. Synthetic a posteriori 
knowledge takes the next step, exploring propositions in subject areas such as the sciences, 
wherein work must be done in order to determine the conclusion: I have a hypothesis, I conduct 
research, and I am able to draw results from the evidence I collected. Analytic and knowledge a 
posteriori is the null set of this chart, they cannot overlap because there is innate contradiction—
if predicate is logically contained by a subject, we already know this prior to experiencing it. 
So, that leaves the overlap of synthetic judgment and knowledge a priori.  How can 
synthetic a priori propositions even be possible—in mathematics, science, and metaphysics 
(Grier)? Each question is answered by a section of the text—the Transcendental Aesthetic, 
Transcendental Analytic, and Transcendental Dialectic, respectively. Simply enough, the 
conclusion of the first two sections is that this overlap is not possible in mathematics and science. 
It is metaphysics which must be further explored, and this exploration occurs in the Transcendental 
Dialectic—a brief outline of which will occur here, for further exploration in the next section. 
To understand the content of the Transcendental Dialectic, we must first understand the 
meaning of its title. Kant uses the word “transcendental,” traced from the medieval denotation of 
“extra-categorical aspects of beings,” such as truth and goodness, throughout Critique of Pure 
Reason to describe “all knowledge which is occupied not so much with objects as with the mode 
of our knowledge in so far as this mode of knowledge is to be made possible a priori” (Caygill). 
From there, the dialectic is defined as the using of the elements of understanding and reason “as if 
they were an organon for the actual production for at least the semblance of objective assertions” 
(Kant).  
 Within this section is a solid conclusion to the question of the possibility of synthetic a 
priori propositions in metaphysics. Kant argues that these propositions are not possible at all in a 
rejection of the disciplines of special metaphysics. He then offers a critique of these disciplines—
rational psychology, rational cosmology, and rational theology. This rejection, though, is not a 
rejection of theoretical reason—which, ultimately, he believes, has a cognitive role as the “arbiter 
of truth in all judgments.”  
As is evident, Critique of Pure Reason first accomplishes a bridge of the gap between 
rationalism and empiricism by arguing that we can only gain knowledge of the world through both 
“sense experience and concept formation… to form empirical judgments,” and then proceeds to 
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break down reason itself to gain knowledge of the transcendent world, as we will see in the next 
section (Williams).  
 
The Limits of This Understanding: Exegesis of Graham Priest’s Beyond the Limits of 
Thought 
Once we understand the Kantian intersection of distinctions of knowledge, we can build 
upon that foundation and turn to Critique of Pure Reason’s exploration of the limits of four 
concepts: cognition, expression, conception, and iteration. This section will examine these limits 
through literature review of chapters 5 and 6 of Graham Priest’s Beyond the Limits of Thought, 
examining the phenomena-noumena distinction and the Antinomies, respectively. 
 Priest is most notable for his defining work on dialetheism, which claims that true 
contradictions, though very limited, do exist. Though these chapters do not specifically focus on 
dialetheism, they are a testament to the contradictions of Kant—some, interestingly, simply 
because of the disjointed manner of assembly of Critique of Pure Reason; and some because of 
the actual composition of his argumentation.   
Chapter Five of Priest’s work, “Noumena and the Categories”, begins with an explanation 
of Kant’s most crucial distinction, between the phenomena, that which Kant defines as “those 
things perceivable by the senses,” and which are in space and time; and the noumena, that which, 
in essence, is not phenomena. While phenomena can be perceived, noumena can only be 
conceived, including such concepts as God and the Soul. This distinction is further developed by 
what Kant calls Transcendental Idealism, that “objects in themselves cannot be… intuited…what 
are perceived are our mental representations of such objects.” In other words, all that can be given 
to us immediately is appearance, which is just representation—so, the representation perceived is 
a phenomenon, and the thing in itself is a non-empirical noumenon, the transcendental object. This 
is the beginning of our limits of conception.  
 Once we understand this, Priest explains, we can understand how knowledge works, or 
how judgment is categorized. Referring back to the definition offered by Caygill in A Kant 
Dictionary, judgment is simply how we understand the relationship between subject and predicate. 
Every judgment has quantity, quality, relation, and modality, and three “pure” (meaning lacking 
in empirical content) Categories apply to each of these aspects of judgment, as illustrated in the 
following table (Priest). 
 
Quantity Unity 
Plurality 
Totality 
Quality Reality 
Negation 
Limitations 
Relation Substance 
Cause 
Community 
Modality Possibility 
Existence 
Necessity 
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 The most important conclusion that can be drawn from this is that these categories only 
apply to phenomena. Priest outlines two arguments given by Kant to support this.  
 The first, the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories, claims that the nature of 
consciousness is how we can be sure that categories, or language, apply to anything, or reality. 
Unity is a feature of individual consciousness, made possible because objects of consciousness 
themselves possess unity—and in turn, unity itself is possible because judgments using categories 
unify disparate things. Kant argues that applicability of the categories is guaranteed by unity of 
consciousness, and categories are “constitutive [only] of…perceptions”—and because perceptions 
are mental representations, this process of consciousness is only applicable to phenomena.  
 The second, the Schematism of the Pure Understanding, states that in order to apply a 
category we must have some criterion/schema of how to apply it/what it can be applied to. Since 
criteria for all categories involve time, it only makes sense to only apply criteria to that which is 
in time, or phenomena. While this is a straightforward argument, it is also straightforwardly 
criticized—Priest contends that accepting this Schematism depends on accepting that all criteria 
are temporal. 
Here, Priest begins to argue the limitations on Kant’s distinction between phenomena and 
noumena, which exist first in the form of contradiction. If categories cannot be applied to noumena, 
as is a key component of this distinction, there is contradiction in the very limit of thought. 
 This is the first limit, the limit of cognition—that categories can only be applied to 
phenomena means that there can be no knowledge of noumena, which puts precise limits on the 
extent of knowledge itself. If this is the case, Kant is inherently-self referential, as his book 
purports to inform its audience about noumena. However, Kant did face this argument, and 
counters that Critique of Pure Reason does not actually give knowledge of noumena, but something 
less, stating that “though we cannot know these objects as things in themselves, we must be in a 
position to at least think them as things in themselves.” To this, Priest’s argument is as follows: it 
is misleading to think that we cannot know anything about noumena, because it suggests an 
impossibility of knowledge due to epistemic access, when it is actually due to conceptual access; 
in fact, we cannot have knowledge because we cannot make statements, as any statement would 
have to apply the categories; and ultimately it is as impossible to entertain thoughts about noumena 
as it is to actually know anything about them—which is ultimately a more fundamental 
contradiction than previously even expected.  
 Limits of expression are also relevant, as Kant’s distinction makes assertions about 
noumena, and in doing so, it applies the categories that he himself conceptualized. If, then, 
noumena are precisely contradictory, this is beyond the third type of limit, the limit of 
conception—if we cannot make judgments about noumena, we cannot think of them at all, and 
they are beyond conceivable. However, judgments about noumena are made, and therefore they 
are thought about; Kant’s awareness of this contradiction results in what he calls The Ground of 
The Distinction of All Objects in General into Phenomena and Noumena. Kant distinguishes 
between the “illegitimate positive” notion of noumenon, and the “legitimate negative (limiting),” 
notion of noumenon. The latter places limits on where we can apply categories and make 
judgments—but to say that there are things we cannot judge is to make a judgment.  
 Essentially, this constitutes a problem of contradiction, which applies to anyone who holds 
that categories do not apply to noumena yet wants “even to consider propositions about them.” 
Priest offers two solutions to this problem: that we give up all talk of noumena, which is admittedly 
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not feasible; or that we accept Transcendental Idealism, which purports that “things we normally 
take ourselves to be familiar with are representations.” 
Now we delve into Chapter 6, “Kant’s Antinomies,” and the fourth limit of thought—the 
limit of iteration/the iterable. There are four Antinomies, corresponding to four kinds of categories 
and all following the same abstract structure. Each category produces a condition, and the 
accepting of a condition can produce a series. An arbitrary phenomenon is then created: from a 
starting point, applications of a generator are iterated, from which we may obtain the limit. Since 
each category produces a condition, the limit of each Antinomy is that which is unconditioned. 
Priest also clarifies that a sequence can be generated either this way, or as a result of applying an 
operator as frequently as possible. While this structure does get confusing, what is necessarily 
consistent is that each Antinomy possesses a generator, an antithesis demonstrating that it is 
“always possible to apply the generator again” with a limit “too small for the concept,” and a thesis 
demonstrating that if the limit is generated by an infinite amount of applications to the generator, 
trouble ensues, with a limit “too large for the concept.” 
 The First Antinomy, The Beginning of the Cosmos, rests on a distinction between time and 
space. Its generator is an “event at a (fixed) temporal duration prior to x,” for which the limit is 
obtained by iterated applications of this generator to an arbitrary event, and in this case, the limit 
is a sequence of events stretching back as far as possible. The contradiction of the First Antinomy 
is that its limit both has and does not have a last/temporally first member—that the cosmos “is and 
is not bounded in time past.” Without such a member, the thesis argues, we would be faced with a 
completed infinite, which is impossible. On the contrary, as Priest explains, the antithesis argues 
that if there were a last member, there would be an infinity of time when no events occurred, 
therefore there never would have been a reason for the beginning of cosmos—and therefore there 
never would have been cosmos. 
 The Second Antinomy, The Divisibility of Matter, is spatial, and its generator is the “fixed 
fractional part of x.” In this case, we begin with an arbitrary piece of matter, apply the generator 
iteratively, and produce a limit in the form of a piece of matter to which the generator can no longer 
be applied. This piece of matter is called the simple, and contradiction comes into play in the 
understanding that physical objects are and are not made of simples. The thesis argues that, in 
thought, it is always possible to decompose any compound part of an object—and if all parts 
decompose the object disappears, making it not a subject. The antithesis argues that the simple part 
would occupy space, and as all spaces are divisible, the simple itself would be correspondingly 
divisible, which is impossible.  
 The Third Antinomy, Causal Chain, is related to the causation of events, and its generator 
is the “natural cause of X”; here, we begin with an arbitrary event, apply the generator as far as 
possible to obtain the limit (in this case, a chain of causes)—we are faced with the contradiction 
that the chain has and has not a first member. If the chain of causes for an event has no first 
member, the thesis purports, it goes back to infinity, so the event has no sufficient cause and is 
therefore impossible. In turn, the antithesis states that if a chain has a first member, this has no 
causal determination. The contradiction here is especially notable, as it contradicts a law of 
Kant’s—the Law of Causality, that every event has a cause.  
 The Fourth and final Antinomy, A Necessary Being, is about necessary beings, and its 
generator is the “ground of X” where it produces an object, or a ground, on which X depends for 
its existence when applied to X. This suggests that the contradiction is that dependence is causal, 
which Priest points out as puzzling—is it merely a rerun of the Third Antinomy? If the generator 
is applied iteratively to an object it creates a chain of objects, and the limit becomes the last member 
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of the chain (if there is one), or the whole chain (if not). The thesis here is dependent on the 
antithesis, which states that if the limit is the whole chain, it cannot be necessary because no part 
of it is necessary; if the limit is the first member of the chain this is impossible, because the first 
member is an object in the world, and therefore must have a ground (again, failing by Kant’s Law 
of Causality).  
 Kant argues, ultimately, that though these Antinomies arise in our reasoning about the 
limits of thought, and are often considered to be valid, they are contradictory—and contradictions, 
even at the limits of thought, are not possible. Priest, in keeping with his belief in dialetheism, 
contends that while the arguments of the Antinomies may be flawed, such contradictions are 
possible at the limits of thought. In order to fix the structure of the Antinomies, and defeat Kant, 
Priest proposes his own solution—a Fifth Antinomy. 
 This Antimony is of the limit of thought, and it aligns with Kant’s idea that Antinomy is 
inherent in our reasoning about limits of thought. With this Antinomy, an infinity generator is 
applied to a certain object, and the contradiction lies in that the thought of T is “both (closure) and 
not (Transcendence),” in other words, that the thought of T is both distinct from T and in T—even 
if something does not exist, its content does. At its essence, this Antinomy is the idea that the limit 
can be, and has been, thought of.  
 I will conclude this section with a table included in Beyond the Limits of Thought, 
simplifying both Kant’s Antinomies and Priest’s proposed fifth, for clarification.  
 
ANTINOMY GENERATOR LIMIT [ANTI]THESIS 
1st Event prior to Totality of past states Has [not] a beginning 
2nd Part of The Simple Objects are [not] 
composed 
3rd Cause of Chain of causes Has [not] a first 
member 
4th Ground of First member of chain 
if there is one, whole 
chain if not 
Is [not] necessary 
5th (Priest) Thought of T Can[not] be thought 
of 
 
 
Concluding Remarks 
Considering Kant’s original text and Priest’s critique, the ultimate question is whether true 
contradictions exist. If we accept Priest, that at the limits of thought, they do, then we open the 
door to infinite questions that challenge the very fabric of even the simplest things we hold to be 
true. I side with Kant, and the commonly accepted conclusion that contradictions do not exist. 
However, it is also important to note that sometimes, in extreme contexts such as the limits of 
thought, it can seem that contradictions are possible—is there that which in principle can never be 
conceived by the human mind? Again, here, I agree with Kant—we have the ability to think that 
there are things that in principle can never be conceived, but we cannot think of these things 
themselves.  
On a more practical level, in the face of modern cognitive science, can we even argue that 
Kantian examinations of mind functions are valid? I argue that the latter has merit as a logical 
puzzle, an endless cycle of argumentation and refutation. As there are benefits to be reaped from 
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understanding of both explanations, from both disciplines, perhaps mind activity is an area where 
science can draw from philosophy, and vice versa. If, in this way, we transcend limits of both areas 
through interconnectedness and interdependency, it is not inconceivable to suggest that the 
unthinkable will become thinkable, and the unanswerable questions will be answered. 
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 Metaphors and Models 
 
Morgan McConnell 
 
        People use language to communicate and explain complex ideas. This language, however, 
is only symbolic representation. As an essential part of language, metaphor conveys ideas through 
representational comparison. These comparisons are necessary in language when no other existing 
word or phrase can properly express a concept. Since metaphors are so prevalent in 
communication, scientists also use metaphors through scientific models to explain the world and 
how it works. Although scientific models have predictive ability and provide other valuable 
scientific benefits, their metaphorical properties limit their scientific utility due to barriers 
presented by the limitations inherent in verbal and nonverbal human communication. I will first 
examine the general definition and role of metaphors as explained by David Hills as well as the 
arguments of Donald Davidson and Max Black on the function and limits of metaphors. I will then 
analyze the views of Ronald Giere and Black on models and their properties. Finally, I will identify 
specific cases in which scientific models and metaphors interact, including a closer look at the use 
of metaphor in model building. Through my analysis, I will demonstrate how the relationship 
between models and metaphors limits science. 
 
Metaphors 
Metaphors exemplify the ways in which language is limited. In “Metaphor,” David Hills 
states, “The primary subject of a metaphor may be a particular thing, or it may be a whole kind of 
thing, and likewise for the secondary subject.” In this sense, metaphor may attempt to describe 
something simple. For example, a person may be compared to an animal or a celestial object to 
better explain certain characteristics belonging to that individual. However, a metaphor can also 
describe a complex system. Meteorological phenomena interact to create a weather system, but 
this system can still be described and understood through a simple metaphor. For instance, the 
weather may be likened to a battle.  This comparison allows the reader to draw conclusions and 
gain understanding about the process even though it is explained in linguistic terms.  
However, metaphors are not limited to speech and literature; they have other uses. Hills 
argues that metaphors can be comprised of both verbal and nonverbal signs. These signs do not 
possess specific meaning until they are used to communicate an idea. For instance, a plus sign is a 
nonverbal form of communication that possesses different meanings based on the context; it could 
imply that something is being added or that something is positive. Since nonverbal signs are just 
as flexible as verbal signs in interpretation and use, images and objects can also be used 
metaphorically to represent a system as words do. Therefore, the variety of meanings that can be 
associated with verbal and nonverbal signs makes it difficult to accurately describe a system. If 
language is nothing more than symbolic representation, then any model conveyed to others through 
language is only symbolic. Thus, anything created with metaphorical properties must be 
understood based on use. 
In “What Metaphors Mean,” Donald Davidson argues that metaphors are literary devices 
that do not hold any hidden meaning; their meaning is understood based on how the metaphors are 
used. He states, “What metaphor adds to the ordinary is an achievement that uses no semantic 
resources beyond the resources on which the ordinary depends” (Davidson 31). Metaphorical 
statements differ from ordinary statements; however, metaphors are still restricted to the ordinary 
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use of language. In this regard, they should be taken literally. Since metaphors have literal 
meanings, they cannot be paraphrased. This act of paraphrasing would change the metaphor and 
alter its literal meaning. If the meaning of the metaphor is altered in this manner, then the 
interpreter is attempting to find a different meaning within the metaphor, which is an incorrect 
approach that fails to recognize the literal statement. For this reason, understanding a metaphor 
requires analysis of only the literal meaning of the metaphor. The interpretation of the literal 
meaning of the metaphor separates it from all other literary devices, including similes.  
Davidson compares metaphors to similes to demonstrate how metaphors should be 
understood as literal statements. The intended use of the metaphor is the best way to understand 
its literal meaning. When interpreting a metaphor figuratively, an individual may attempt to 
analyze each separate word of the metaphor to decipher the deeper meaning. This interpretation 
ignores literal meaning and the importance of use in metaphor. Let us look at this statement: “An 
infant is like an infant.” The term “like” directly compares the word “infant.” This comparison 
relates the infants based on the fact that they share similar properties because they are both infants. 
Likewise, if one states, “A man is like an infant,” then one indicates that the man and the infant 
literally share similar properties, such as personality or behavioral traits. However, this literal 
comparison through simile is not the literal meaning of the metaphor. Davidson states, “the 
figurative meaning of a metaphor is the literal meaning of the corresponding simile” (38). 
Therefore, the figurative meaning of the sentence “A man is an infant” has the same literal meaning 
as the sentence “A man is like an infant.” This simile leads an interpreter to understand the term 
“man” based on what is known about the word “infant.” The interpretation is limited to the 
definitions of words, because the understanding of the subject will be shaped only through the 
primary definitions of the word to which it is compared; it does not take into account how two 
words can interact to create new meaning. For example, when taking the figurative approach, the 
interpreter may only come to the conclusion that a man has the same defining qualities as an infant, 
including dependence and frequent crying. However, this surface-level interpretation of metaphor 
fails to recognize more complex interpretations.  
In contrast, the literal meaning of the metaphor inspires interpretation based on use. 
Davidson states, “The most obvious difference between simile and metaphor is that all similes are 
true and most metaphors are false” (41). He elaborates by explaining that it is true that the Earth 
is like a floor, but it is false to argue that the Earth is a floor. By adding the “like,” the simile 
automatically declares that it is comparing the properties of two things. In contrast, a metaphor 
that states that something “is” something else fails to convey this note of comparison. For this 
reason, metaphor attempts to argue that something is fact even when it is not. However, metaphors 
may not actually be false; instead, metaphors are interpreted to be false. Metaphors, although 
primarily serving as modes of comparison, possess qualities that appear outwardly false because 
they state that two unlike things are the same thing. The literal meaning or intent of the metaphor, 
though, is not false even if the metaphor appears outwardly false. A metaphor requires the use of 
words to draw an unlikely comparison with the intent of revealing something new but truthful. A 
metaphor functions more as a tool for explanation, using comparisons that strengthen a literal idea 
or argument. Thus, metaphors should be interpreted based on the use and interaction of words, a 
concept that Max Black explains further in his article “Metaphor.” 
Black mostly agrees with Davidson in his explanation of metaphor. According to Black, in 
a linguistic metaphor, at least one word is metaphorical and at least one word is literal. The 
metaphor is connected to the literal word to expand upon the literal scenario or description given 
by that word. In this sense, the metaphor is an expansion upon what is known to be literal. When 
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discussing what would occur if a metaphor were translated into another language, Black asserts 
that a metaphor is a metaphor because of its semantic meaning and not because of its syntactical 
properties. Therefore, the meaning of a metaphor can be understood in another language, and the 
main qualities of that metaphor and its intended use can also be understood. Even though cultural 
differences may result in different interpretations of the metaphor, the statement will still be 
acknowledged as metaphorical, and the best form of interpretation would be to analyze the intent 
of the author to understand the original meaning in its cultural context. In this regard, Black agrees 
with Davidson on the matter of usage and meaning of metaphor. While a metaphor is open to 
interpretation, this interpretation needs to relate to the original intent of the creator. An 
interpretation of the metaphor without understanding the intent will result in a misinterpretation. 
However, the process for unlocking the intended meaning of the metaphor depends on the view of 
metaphor to which the interpreter subscribes. 
 The substitution, comparison, and interacting views highlight the different routes for 
interpreting metaphors. The substitution view of metaphor understands metaphors as stand-ins for 
other words or phrases. This substitution means that the metaphor is literal since it can be replaced 
with a literal word or phrase. For example, Black explains that mathematicians used the word “leg” 
when describing the line of an angle. This example articulates how a metaphor can possess a 
practical, literal meaning. The metaphor is intended to explain something that actually exists but 
that cannot be briefly explained without substituting it for another word or phrase.  
The comparison view understands metaphor as an alternative way of presenting an analogy 
or simile. It is a case of the substitution view that argues that a metaphor is “a condensed or 
elliptical simile” (Black, “Metaphor” 283). This view highlights how a metaphor uses substitution 
to draw a comparison between two things. The elliptical simile is a simplified version of 
understanding the role of metaphor; this view holds that the literal meaning of the metaphor shares 
the same literal meaning as the simile that it attempts to substitute. Black explains the elliptical 
simile by presenting the sentence, “Richard is a lion.” While the substitution view would 
understand this sentence to mean, “Richard is brave,” the comparison view would understand it to 
mean, “Richard is like a lion (in being brave)” (Ibid 283). This comparison provides literal meaning 
of the metaphor through the literal meaning of the simile. It indicates that a metaphor can be 
understood literally without an appreciation of the figurative elements provided by metaphor.  
 Black most strongly agrees with the interacting view of metaphor. As the name implies, 
the interacting view focuses on the interactions between two or more concepts that create a new 
meaning or understanding through their interaction. Metaphor creates something new beyond the 
obvious meaning of the metaphor. The metaphor allows for a new perspective based on the 
interaction of the words and ideas in the metaphor. For this reason, Black explains, “I would not 
deny that a metaphor may involve a number of subordinate metaphors among its implication. But 
these subordinate metaphors are, I think, usually intended to be taken less ‘emphatically’” (Ibid 
290). Metaphors can be interpreted differently, meaning not all metaphors possess a single literal 
meaning as intended by the creator. Due to the interaction between the two or more elements of a 
metaphor, multiple meanings can be interpreted. While these other meanings are not as significant 
as the primary, intended meaning, they do exist and can be interpreted in a new and different way. 
In this regard, metaphors are subject to new interpretations and function as a basis for establishing 
new understanding.  However, this understanding must still relate to the initial use, which allows 
these new interpretations to form. 
Davidson and Black both identify how metaphor has literal meaning in its goal to either 
compare two or more subjects based on likeness or to create new understanding through the 
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interaction of these subjects. Assuming that models function like metaphors, based on Davidson’s 
argument, scientific models do intend to literally communicate a concept. However, they are 
limited by the tools that scientists use to explain a system. Metaphors allow for literal comparison 
to occur, meaning that the understanding of models as metaphors still allows models to be 
considered literal depictions of the system when they are used to predict outcomes. However, 
viewing models as metaphors suggests that the ability to understand a system is restricted to the 
current view of reality and the descriptions that humans can create based on that reality through 
comparison. Black’s argument suggests that, while the literal meaning exists, literal meaning may 
also carry with it other metaphors and interpretations. This idea relates to how scientific models, 
if they are in fact metaphors, shift and inspire new hypotheses and learning. Since metaphors and 
models both function through intended use, they both provide insight on a subject to improve 
thought and analysis. The literal intent of metaphors and models allows one to explore and test an 
idea through comparisons and the interactions of different concepts, but the development of new 
interpretations and the establishment of new models through other comparisons may lead scientists 
farther from the actual system as they examine it through layers of metaphor. Deeper analysis of 
models and their functions in reality will clarify these points.  
 
Models 
     In “An agent-based conception of models and scientific representation,” Ronald Giere 
argues that models function as forms of representation that lead to deeper understanding about the 
world. Giere begins his analysis of scientific models by examining their relationship with 
hypotheses. He states, “A ‘hypothesis’ is a claim (statement) that a fully interpreted and specified 
model fits a particular real system more or less well” (271). Models are used in hypotheses, and 
these hypotheses establish ideas about realistic systems. Thus, by their association with 
hypotheses, models are intended to enhance understanding of real systems. However, although 
these models relate to a system, models do not perfectly fit this system. Giere explains, “claims of 
perfect fit cannot be justified simply because every experiment has a margin of error. In addition, 
there is good reason to think that the only model that might exhibit a perfect fit to the world would 
have to be a model that fit everything perfectly” (273). Uncertainty in experimental data can 
produce discrepancy between the model and the experimental results. While models are still valid 
forms of understanding the system and making predictions of the outcomes or responses of the 
system, models will never exactly fit every system that is tested. For this reason, models cannot be 
either true or false, because the fit of the system is dependent upon the use of the model. Since the 
model is not a perfect fit, the model by itself cannot convey absolute truth. The model does carry 
truth in how it is used to examine a system, but this truth does not convey every aspect of the 
system. Thus, the model is neither true nor false; the hypothesis that is modeled is true or false, 
and the model still will not portray an absolute truth.  
Giere continues his analysis by relating models to symbols and language. He argues that 
scientists use models with intention, stating, “Agents (1) intend; (2) to use model, M; (3) to 
represent a part of the world, W; (4) for some purpose, P” (274). A model, then, is created with 
specific purpose, and this purpose is to demonstrate elements of the world and how they function 
through an alternate form. For this reason, the use of language is similar to the use of models. 
Models, like language, utilize symbolic representations. In this regard, models function as alternate 
forms of communication for explaining scientific theories and hypotheses. A model uses symbols 
with intended meaning that allow for an accurate representation of the world. Similarly, people 
that possess language naturally create abstract objects, including symbols and other forms of 
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representation. Scientific models, which are expressed through symbols like objects and equations, 
are created through the same processes as language, because both models and language have 
symbolic and representative attributes. In this sense, models function as explanations of the world 
through representational terms. The creation of models requires symbols, and these symbols 
communicate information based on their use, just like language. 
Likewise, in “Models and Archetypes,” Max Black argues that models primarily exist as 
representations of the world. Black states, “There is no such thing as a perfectly faithful model; 
only by being unfaithful in some respect can a model represent its original” (“Models” 220). Thus, 
models cannot be perfect fits to the original, because then they would be duplicates. Models must 
be different from the original in some ways, but the model cannot be so different that it does not 
relate to the original. In this sense, Black agrees with Giere by arguing that models, while accurate, 
cannot fit the system perfectly. According to Black, models are solely representative and are not 
perfect reflections of a system. He asserts that this claim is true even when dealing with data in 
mathematical models. Mathematical models are “simpler and more abstract” than the modeled 
system. Mathematical models are developed by analyzing data to represent systems, and these 
models simplify these systems. In a simplified model, it is easier to make calculations by 
eliminating certain complications posed by a complex model. This manipulation of the model 
indicates that models represent the system and are not entirely, although partially, true to the 
system.  
Black continues this analysis of models as representation through an examination of 
analogies. When considering early models of the atom, the models were constructed as 
representations and not exact depictions, even though the intention of the models was to show the 
atom as it is. The goal is not to portray every aspect of a system; it is to establish a model that can 
be used for study and experimentation. Models explain a system through different means of 
comparison, and scientists consciously understand that they are not describing all of the qualities 
of a system when creating a model. However, models are not in themselves analogies or metaphors. 
Black states, “[Scientists] used language appropriate to the model in thinking about the domain of 
application: they worked not by analogy, but through and by means of an underlying analogy” 
(Ibid 229). Models are specific representations and not loose comparisons between a system and 
another object or function. The model is not in itself an analogy or metaphor; a model is its own 
entity that is created by utilizing properties of comparison. For instance, a model of the solar 
system may use perfect spheres to represent planets to simplify the model. These perfect spheres 
are used to create the model, but the model still represents the system as it is.  
In spite of the similarities between metaphors and models, Black does not view models as 
direct metaphors. Although metaphors and models are similar, their dissimilarities preclude any 
inference that all models are metaphors. For example, both metaphors and models use elements of 
analogy, or comparison. This comparison creates new insight by explaining a system or idea. 
However, while any person could create an average metaphor, a scientific model requires greater 
insight and more skill than merely drawing a basic comparison. For this reason, models cannot be 
metaphors. Instead, he thinks of models as archetypes, explaining, “By an archetype I mean a 
systematic representation of ideas by means of which a given thinker describes, by analogical 
extension, some domain to which these ideas do not immediately and literally apply” (Ibid 241). 
The archetype uses elements of analogy to describe or represent a system, however, he does not 
believe that these analogies provide literal description. Thus, models are not literal due to their use 
of analogy; instead, the system is literal and the model is only an attempt to represent it. Therefore, 
using metaphors to describe a system can spark scientific investigation and serve as a tool for 
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explanation; however, models are also more than just metaphors, because models have predictive 
qualities that metaphors lack. While the metaphor may be the starting point, the model must be 
validated through empirical evidence. 
Both Giere and Black explain models in terms of representation. They agree that models 
do not perfectly describe a system. This limitation confirms that models in themselves are not 
exact. This conclusion relates to metaphors in the sense that metaphors also do not perfectly 
describe the world either. Metaphors, like models, must draw comparisons between two things to 
encourage new insight. For example, Giere specifically examines models in terms of language 
symbols and their comparative elements. This relationship between models and symbols 
demonstrates how models are created through processes similar to language. Thus, although 
models may lack perfect truth when describing a system, their goal is to explain the system using 
symbols that can communicate a concept relating to a true and literal system. While Giere is 
accurate in explaining how models function in relation to realistic systems in terms of perfect fit, 
he ignores the process of experimentation. Seldom is the isolated system investigated in scientific 
experiments; the system interacts with too many variables that affect the outcome. For this reason, 
scientists attempt to control the variables in an experiment so that the experimental system can fit 
the model. In this sense, models work most accurately when certain elements of the system are 
controlled, meaning the model may not function correctly when analyzing the system outside of 
the controlled environment. In his own examination of models, Black recognizes the comparative 
properties of models in relation to their fit to a system but denies that models are exactly like 
metaphors or analogies. However, his belief that models are like archetypes supports the argument 
that models use representation through means of comparison that cannot completely describe a 
system. Even if models are not metaphors, they utilize a structure similar to that of a metaphor, 
because the modeled system must be represented through metaphorical or comparative terms. It is 
how the models and metaphors are used that determines their intent and success when exploring 
ideas. A look at specific examples of metaphor in science will help to expand on this concept.  
 
Metaphors and Models 
A commonly raised question is whether models are synonymous with metaphors based on 
how they are understood by those who study them. In “Models in Science,” Roman Frigg and 
Stephen Hartman argue that a description can be translated into another language, noting that the 
description can be and must be changed to make sense in a different language. However, a model 
does not need to be changed to make sense in another language. Furthermore, models and 
descriptions have different properties. I argue that, presumably, all people looking at a model of 
the solar system will understand the model in the same way regardless of their native language. 
However, models still use elements similar to language, including symbols, in their attempts to 
explain a system. This use of symbols cannot be ignored.  
Let us look at this concept in terms of the moon. There may be many different ways to 
describe the moon, but the moon still remains the moon. Similarly, there may be different ways to 
explain or portray a system, but the system still remains the system. Now, let us say that there is 
no discrepancy in language and that a universally understood word for “moon” exists. Everyone 
who hears the word “moon” should understand the general properties of the moon based on that 
word. Likewise, a description of the moon should also convey at least similar ideas about the moon. 
If a scientific model of the moon was created to demonstrate what the moon is, then everyone who 
saw the model should be able to know the general properties of the moon. This scientific model 
may be more precise than a verbal description, but they are both limited in similar ways. Although 
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there may be more interpretations of a description than of the model, both the model and the 
description may not successfully explain all of the information that can be known about the moon. 
We are still limited in our ability to fully explain the moon in either situation.  Even though 
linguistic descriptions may possess different properties than scientific models, both are limited by 
the use of symbols. Both, to some extent, struggle to accurately represent every aspect of a system.  
Since scientific models only describe certain aspects of a system, they are like metaphors, which 
only capture certain elements of the described subject while trying to convey deeper understanding 
through use.  
This similarity between metaphors and scientific models highlights how the two interact. 
Frigg and Hartman outline the variety of models used to explain phenomena, including idealized 
models and analogical models. These models both attempt to explain or study a system by 
simplifying the system. For example, an idealized model alters some information about the system 
to reduce the difficulties of calculations. The example provided by Frigg and Hartman explains 
how a model of the solar system may portray the planets as perfect spheres to simplify calculations. 
This example demonstrates how models possess elements of metaphor, because it must be 
simplified so that it can be understood and used. While the model can produce outcomes, the 
system still has to be described differently than how it actually exists to make that prediction easier. 
Similarly, an analogical model examines a system through the lens of another system. Frigg and 
Hartman provide the example of how the atomic nucleus can be explained through a fluid drop. 
The analogical model takes two seemingly separate systems to outline the function of one or the 
other. For this reason, the use of analogy is valuable in both literary and scientific contexts. It 
appears that models can explain systems through comparison, proving that models are limited to 
current understanding of language and other systems. 
Along with analogy, models also contain symbolic representation that assists in describing 
an idea. For example, visual scientific models may use certain colors and shapes to explain a 
process or to show the structure of an object, like a cell. However, these colors may not exist in 
the actual system or subject. Similarly, the shapes used in the model may be close or similar to 
those in the actual system or subject, but they may not be entirely precise. The lack of precision in 
scientific models is further confirmed by the simple fact that that models have changed throughout 
history while the actual system remains the same. For example, let us look at the different models 
of the atom. Dalton’s model of the atom showed only the atom as a solid circle while the current 
model of the atom contains a nucleus surrounded by electrons. When scientists gained more 
knowledge about the atom, they managed to describe it with better models. The failure of the 
original model to be entirely accurate, however, proves that the model is only symbolic. It does 
not flawlessly explain a system; it only attempts to describe it through representational symbols. 
        Symbols also appear in models in the form of symbolic language. The measurement of 
light demonstrates the limitations of models based on terminology. In Quantum Physics, Rae 
states: 
 
One of the consequences of wave–particle duality is that it sets limits on the amount 
of information that can be obtained about a quantum system at any one time. Thus 
we can either choose to measure the wave properties of light by allowing it to pass 
through a double slit without detecting through which slit the photon passes or we 
can observe the photons as they pass through the slits. (282) 
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The model of wave-particle duality exists because scientists already understand how waves and 
particles function. Since light seems to possess characteristics of both waves and particles, it is 
difficult to understand how it functions outside of current knowledge regarding wave and particle 
behavior. Light is neither a particle nor a wave, but the experiments result in either particle or wave 
behavior. Scientists already understand waves and particles, so “wave-particle duality” is applied 
to explain the properties of light by comparing it to what is already understood. However, using 
this comparison limits the understanding of light by constraining it to what is already known. In 
this regard, models are limited by the terms that scientists choose to use. These terms have 
preexisting meanings that restrict what can be communicated through models because the models 
are based on the other terms, indicating a lack of ability to portray new concepts without using 
comparison.  
 
Building Models Through Metaphor 
 Having discussed some examples of the relationship between metaphors and models, let 
us examine a more nuanced explanation of metaphor with regard to model building. This section 
will analyze how physicists use elements of metaphor to establish models based on simple 
harmonic motion. These metaphorical properties identify the limitations of science through 
barriers in communication and explanation as they use models. 
In “Models and Representation,” R.I.G. Hughes demonstrates how models in physics, 
including quantum mechanics, are based on theoretical concepts about physical systems. Hughes 
states, “Quantum mechanics, on the other hand, starts from simple energy configurations like the 
infinite potential wells, simple harmonic oscillators, and Coulomb potentials that are introduced 
in basic texts, and deduces the permissible wave-functions of systems in these configurations” 
(331). Complex concepts in physics, like the wave-function, can be understood and modeled 
through these other configurations. These configurations, including simple harmonic oscillations, 
are theoretical concepts that explain physical systems. These theories function as the backbone for 
other models in physics. When explaining how scientific models are representations, Hughes 
explains, “Similarly, the wave theory of light represents light as a wave motion. It invites us to 
think of optical phenomena in terms of the propagation of waves, and so to anticipate and explain 
the behavior of light” (331). This idea of light functioning as a wave is connected to understanding 
the wave-function and how it relates to basic energy configurations. The wave-function, then, is a 
representation that explains the behavior of light based on previously understood concepts. For 
this reason, scientists understand elements of quantum mechanics through models of other 
configurations that are limited to representational properties and limitations of the model used for 
comparisons. 
I argue that basing scientific concepts on other configurations brings into question the 
ability of models to explain an actual physical system. Simple harmonic motion is a cyclic motion 
of a mass that results from a linear restoring force. The inertia of the moving mass ensures that it 
continues through the equilibrium point and continues to oscillate. In physics, this motion is often, 
but not exclusively, demonstrated through the “mass on a spring” model. This model, which 
features a mass attached to a spring to illustrate the motion, is based on the theoretical concept of 
simple harmonic motion. The model helps to show the physical process so that it can be studied. 
The model is then often used as an analogy in physics to explain more complex ideas. 
Mathematical equations are created to explain these processes, including particle motion. 
However, developing a model based on another model raises issues when deciphering what the 
second analogical model is describing. This model could be modeling the actual system, or it could 
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be modeling the model of that system. If Model A is an accepted model of a system, then one who 
creates Model B based on Model A will be confined to the existing limitations of Model A. Thus, 
Model B is limited by Model A. The relationship between Model A and Model B shows that 
models can be constructed through analogical concepts. This relationship illustrates that models 
may not be exact representations of a system but attempts at comparing what is unknown (Model 
B) to what is known (Model A.)  
This development of Model A and Model B is similar to the development of metaphor 
because both use analogy, further highlighting how metaphors and models share similar properties. 
As previously explained, the “mass on a spring” model is known to be a representation of the 
system, and a reference to the model directly relates to the system that it attempts to describe. For 
this reason, many analogical models in physics are based on it. A similar process occurs in 
language. Let us think about how a word can relate to an object or system. The word “sun” directly 
represents the sun, the center of our solar system. Anyone with basic knowledge about the sun 
would hear or see the word “sun” and automatically think of that object. As argued in previous 
sections, metaphors attempt to literally describe something through comparison and interaction. 
For this comparison to occur, the new concept must be related to or interact with another word that 
carries a similar idea so that new insight can be gained. For instance, when describing a person, 
one could say, “He is the sun.” This metaphor describes someone as he is by using a previously 
understood symbol or concept to explain these characteristics and inspire deeper thought. Thus, 
people create metaphors similarly to how scientists create analogical models. Both require the 
building of ideas based on currently existing symbols, and these new ideas move farther away 
from the original concept as more layers of comparison are added. Since metaphors exist to explain 
an idea that cannot be communicated without comparison, the use of comparison by scientists 
demonstrates a limitation in their ability to communicate new ideas. Therefore, if models possess 
metaphorical properties, then models may not be perfect fits to a system because of the limitations 
of communication and use. Models are valuable to scientists based on their use and not on their 
ability to fully capture every aspect of a system. 
 
Conclusion 
Models and metaphors have many similarities, and these similarities reveal the limits of 
science as scientists attempt to describe systems.  Metaphors are created through comparison to 
help explain concepts when the existing language does not have the proper words to convey an 
idea. These comparisons should be taken literally, expressing something as it actually is even 
though the metaphor has limited descriptive ability. Saying that a model is metaphorical is not to 
say that a model fails to explain how the world functions or that the functions of the world do not 
actually exist. Instead, models work like metaphors in that they try to explain a system as 
thoroughly and accurately as possible in spite of the barriers surrounding scientific 
communication.  Models are valuable in scientific experimentation because they can be used to 
cross the barrier between what is known and what is unknown. Like metaphors, models are able 
to answer questions about the world through their use. The intended purpose of the model and the 
metaphor enables them to function accurately, and this use allows them to inspire discovery. 
Therefore, models are capable of testing hypotheses and expanding scientific knowledge through 
comparison so that scientists can overcome the limitations surrounding communication and the 
study of abstract concepts.  
Also, like metaphors, models build on preexisting representations. In this regard, models 
are embedded in higher-level models, pulling farther away from the actual system by explaining 
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the process in other terms. The development of analogical models makes the new models limited 
to the accuracy of the original model, because the original model is the base for the other models. 
If Model B is based on Model A, then Model B is limited to the preexisting limitations of Model 
A. If Model C is based on Model B, then Model C is limited to the preexisting limitations of Model 
A and Model B. Therefore, the number of limitations increases as new models are developed based 
on other models. Although these models are valuable in their use, the creation of new models based 
on other models is similar to creating an extended metaphor that continues to grow in its 
explanation of a concept. As the metaphor grows, it deviates farther from the actual system in its 
attempt to describe an idea. When taken literally, the metaphorical description is still valid in 
providing insight, but the reality is not portrayed exactly. Therefore, as models develop through 
the use of other models, the layers of metaphor build, and these layers distance the new models 
from the reality as new limitations are created through these comparisons.  
In his examination of a theory of anti-realism, philosopher Bas van Fraassen notes, “the 
language of science should be literally construed, but its theories need not be true to be good” 
(624). Thus, if scientific language is meant literally, then this language, as with metaphors, is 
fallible but valuable in use. If the theories explained through scientific language are fallible, they 
can still be useful even if they are not accurate, because they can still lead to insight, just like 
metaphors. While models are not exactly like metaphors in terms of their linguistic properties, 
models rely on the use of symbols and comparisons in a way that indicates that they are not capable 
of truly capturing the system and how it operates; even though they come close to doing so, the 
need for comparison adds an extra barrier. This problem in communication prevents scientists from 
knowing the full reality, indicating that the limits of science are connected to the limits of language. 
While the function of scientific symbols is to explain the system, the symbols still may not entirely 
capture that system in its entirety since the system is limited to these forms of expression. 
Assuming that the scientific language is accurate and literal, then scientists are still limited to how 
those scientific symbols are used. Scientific theories, then, are not entirely accurate because all 
theories are limited to human ability to comprehend and explain the world. 
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 The Limits of Human Knowledge: 
Christianity, Science, and the Human Mind 
 
Sara Nelson 
 
 The human mind is an inherently complex, ever-changing entity. It allows human beings 
the experience of a conscious existence, an understanding of what we perceive to be our reality, as 
well as growth in various domains of our being. The mind is the lens through which we discover 
ourselves and others, shaping our beliefs. It gives us the ability to question, to wonder, and 
continues to develop throughout one’s lifetime. While our mind seems to be the key to unlocking 
what was once unknown and acquiring new knowledge, an enduring question remains: is there a 
limit to the capacity of our mind, and, if so, why must this be? I have found meaningful and relevant 
insight exploring this complicated and multi-faceted inquiry, pertaining to both religious 
constructs and scientific fields. As Karl Popper wisely states, “The more we learn about the world, 
and the deeper our learning, the more conscious, specific, and articulate will be our knowledge of 
what we do not know, our knowledge of our ignorance” (Yanofsky 9). The tenets of Christian faith 
and the methods and discoveries of science yield revelations regarding perspectives of limitations 
faced by human beings, especially those related to the capacity of the mind.  
 In the pages that follow, I will endeavor to capture the foundational framework of the 
aforementioned viewpoints, including references to resources offering historical research and 
context for conceptualizing these central topics. While there remains much to be discovered in this 
world and beyond, I posit that the limits of our cognition indeed exist, in practice as well as in 
principle, and ensure a boundary between our current knowledge and unlimited discovery, which 
is evident by our lack of ultimate clarity or understanding in both science and religion. Limitations 
which are said to exist in practice are not insignificant, as inherent within them are forces which 
we cannot understand, those which establish our ultimate, in principle, limitations. In other words, 
what limits us in practice does so due to an underlying principle, often beyond our capacity to 
know, thus playing a fundamental role in conveying ultimate limitations of human knowledge. The 
work of Immanuel Kant, as it relates to the limits of concrete knowledge and reason in order to 
“make room for faith”, sets the stage for a parallel exploration of limitations to ultimate meaning 
and understanding (Pasternack). In fact, the religious and scientific limits we experience whilst on 
earth serve a meaningful intention, to guide the very purpose of our lives, shaping both our physical 
and spiritual existence. We can strive to expand upon our body of knowledge but undeniably 
become overwhelmed when faced with questions such as the nature of God and the afterlife, or 
our purpose of being brought into existence in the first place. Therefore, the boundaries we 
encounter as we strive to push forward in discovery of deeper meaning and understanding of all 
aspects of our lives can serve to balance our expectations of fulfilling seemingly limitless goals.  
 
Knowledge and Christianity   
 In this section, I will detail Christianity’s exploration of the unknown and highlight 
supporting assertions which parallel the notion that the limit of human understanding is a 
fundamental truth, presenting human beings with the opportunity to experience faith as a nexus to 
lived reality when complete knowledge is unattainable. Throughout history, various religions have 
developed ideologies with diverging characteristics yet with a unifying emphasis on faith and 
belief. Christianity is one of the widespread religions with unique rituals and an enduring presence, 
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powerful in the lives of its many followers. Especially in times of uncertainty, religion is called 
upon as a source of comfort, community, and hope. Individuals who follow the tenets of Christian 
faith turn to representatives of the church and to their own connection with Jesus through prayer, 
sermons, and in living their lives in a way which reflects their religious commitments. In this 
religious approach, acceptance of the unknown is addressed through both active teachings as well 
as references found in the Bible, connected with faith in God and his vision. Faith remains a central 
component of processing questions which seem to be out of reach or especially challenging to 
comprehend, thought-provoking and abstract topics regarding creation, the meaning of our 
existence, God, and death, for instance.  
 The consistency and predictability found to be a characteristic of many religions is also 
present in Christianity’s approach to addressing these natural questions. By looking to a 
monotheistic religion for insight into perspectives of faith, one can develop an appreciation for 
how followers believe God to determine and design us as well as the world, including other 
instrumental forces we come into contact with, such as those at the heart of scientific pursuits. In 
the Bible, God is said to reveal himself to us in ways he hopes for us to know him, and these 
revelations allow us to perceive God as we experience his presence around and within us. While 
religion inherently can allow followers the feeling of limitless expression, connection, and promise 
for an eternal life with God, it does not seek to provide concrete answers to all inquiries one might 
seek. Therefore, limits to religion as experienced by humankind during a lifetime do exist: “Human 
understanding of God is further limited by the finite faculties that man has been created with. Our 
knowledge of God cannot be exhaustive, for the finite is attempting to understand the Infinite who 
has revealed Himself” (Fowler). Furthermore, these limitations can be viewed as existing in 
principle as well as in practice:  
 
Palin tells us that 'God's activity is accordingly to be conceived as the luring influence 
of love which respects the proper integrity and intrinsic value of others.' Hartshorne 
believes that God is so important to us that his influence will be so great that it sets 
narrow limits to our freedom', and thus 'God can rule the world and orders it, setting 
optimal limits for our free-action, by presenting himself as an essential object... 
(Polkinghorne 67) 
 
God’s intent in giving us life, opportunity, and limitations of our human experience are seen in a 
most positive light, offering us the chance to fully experience the freedoms he intended for us in 
this existence, as created and guided by his all-knowing and all-loving presence. Christianity offers 
a unique set of beliefs which yield insight into the quest to discover perspectives on the limits of 
human cognition with regard to religious and ideological discoveries. This religion does not seek 
to minimize the fact that questions regarding the true nature of things, especially the works of God, 
will always remain unanswered and incomplete. Instead, Christianity is one example of a religion 
that offers as a guiding tenet the premise that God himself is an eternal mystery, inaccessible to 
man in the ways which we traditionally seek understanding:  
 
Our rational inquiry must not blind us to the awe-inspiring and ineffable mystery of 
God to which religious experience bears testimony. Kierkegaard said ‘May we be 
preserved from the blasphemy of men who without being terrified and afraid in the 
presence of God…without the trembling which is the first requirement of 
adoration…hope to have direct knowledge.’ (Polkinghorne 69)  
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There can be no concrete proof, or scientific assurance, of the existence of God and of how the 
divine intervenes within our lives. John Polkinghorne illustrates this point in his work, The Faith 
of a Physicist: “Theology, of course, faces an additional problem in that its method is not only 
elusive but its infinite Subject is also necessarily beyond the total grasp of finite minds. A 
consequence is that it is easier to say negatively what is not the case than to describe positively 
what is the case” (Polkinghorne 39). However, the power of faith strives to close the gap between 
the unknown and that which is comprehensible to human beings: "Vernon White encourages us to 
think of God's revelation in terms of divine saving action rather than in terms of propositional 
knowledge. He says 'epistemology must not hijack ontology'" (Polkinghorne 179). While faith 
does evolve over time, this does not equate to a discovery of ultimate truths and knowledge, which 
are in conflict with the very principles calling faith into practice. The construct we as a species 
have created, faith, can satisfy our desire to explain phenomena that we cannot otherwise detail. 
 The principles of faith that establish the basis for Christianity promote a belief in the power 
of the Creator even when concrete proof is absent. Certain aspects of life as a human being 
necessitate spiritual reflection to be conceptualized, though never completely understood. When 
we experience phenomena from the unique perspective of a conscious human being, we often find 
instances for which we cannot offer a satisfactory explanation, our minds are unable to understand 
in depth. Often intangible and with a strong connection to our emotional selves, experiences such 
as those we find when listening to music, admiring the beauty of nature, feeling love or loyalty, 
have a spiritual nature and can take over our present state and are indicative of the presence of the 
divine: “George Steiner says, ‘I can only put it this way (and every true poem, piece of music or 
painting says it better): there is aesthetic creation because there is creation’” (Polkinghorne 45).   
 The sensations, which transport us to a deeper state of being, are however limited. We 
cannot always summon them independently, they are often transient and fleeting, and human 
beings cannot cognitively explain the occurrences, attributing them to a spiritual state and simply 
appreciating them, reflecting the human capacity. In Ridley’s The Limits of Science, the author 
makes a relevant connection explaining the limitations of science in allowing us understanding of 
certain occurrences:  
 
Aesthetic and moral experiences are highly complex and highly subjective, with 
aspects that are essentially unique to the individual. They are, nevertheless, experiences 
and part of nature, but such unique experiences are for ever outside science’s ken. 
Artworks are also unique. Not that it would seriously dream of doing so, but what can 
science say of interest about Beethoven’s Ninth, the Prima Vera, or Durham Cathedral? 
(Ridley 34) 
 
This commentary sheds light on the challenge of capturing some lived experiences in words, let 
alone understanding in our minds the forces which bring them into being and determine our 
responses to them. We qualify our experiences as spiritual when we acknowledge the limitations 
of any other facet of life to explain them. In the effort of finding a means of categorization, human 
beings search for answers that do not always exist. This realization is an uncomfortable one for 
many because of the innate drive for knowledge we possess and in which we take great pride.  
 Author John Shelby Spong delves into the exploration of Christianity from a unique 
perspective in his book Why Christianity Must Change or Die. As a retired bishop of the Episcopal 
Church, Spong is a believer in God who shares insight into the ability of human beings to fully 
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understand the religion which guides their lives. He states that “God is the ultimate reality” in his 
life, and that he has an ever-present awareness of the divine (Spong 3). At the same time, he notes 
that upon attempting to translate his internal understanding of God into spoken words, he claims 
that language serves to “contract and diminish my God awareness” (Spong 4). This author suggests 
that the passing of time has resulted in a similar process on a much larger scale; believers and 
followers of traditional religious tenets have become more distant and removed from what were 
once unwavering commitments and beliefs. He continues with the suggestion that this includes the 
“loss of God”, as the literal meanings, images, and biblical teachings once at the heart of the 
religion are increasingly challenged and not fully understood (Spong 45).  
 This work includes an argument for inherent limitations experienced by human beings as 
a result of our fundamental nature as designed by our creator:  
 
But theism and God are not the same. Theism is but one human definition of  God. Can 
any human definition ever exhaust the meaning of God? Are we not aware of that 
ancient bit of folk wisdom suggesting that ‘if horses had gods they would look like 
horses’? No creature can fully conceptualize beyond its own limits or its own 
being…despite our human pretensions, that is also true of human beings. If human 
beings have gods, they will look and act remarkably like human beings. None of us can 
ever get beyond that. If we are going to speak of God at all, we must begin by 
acknowledging that limitation. Even if we admit revelation as a source of knowledge, 
that revelation will be received and understood within the limits of the human 
experience. (Spong 47)  
 
Spong’s view of Christianity comes from experience as both a leader and a follower of the faith, 
and is one which confronts criticisms and controversies many choose to avoid. In a contrasting yet 
complementary discipline, scientists seek to close the gap left by the unknown, and succeeds in 
doing so in many instances, especially those explaining how our world fundamentally works. Even 
so, unanswered questions about our nature, purpose, and spirituality are not brought to resolution.  
 
Knowledge, Miracles, and Tragedies 
 The way that we view certain defining events and circumstances such as miracles is 
inherently connected to the way we perceive and interface with the world in our conscious 
existence. This exploration also provides an example of a way in which religion and science differ 
in perspective regarding the existence of limits to human knowledge. Those who believe miracles 
are indeed acts of God, divine interventions beyond our capacity to explain, predict, and 
comprehend, have a perspective closely aligned with many who practice the Christian faith. Often 
in contrast is the view of the scientific minded, who may believe that what appears to some as 
miraculous can in reality be explained by concrete and objective physical phenomena and 
processes, that objective miracles do not exist. The same can be said for tragedies; scientists would 
believe in an underlying cause that could be explained by fundamental occurrences of the natural 
world, not a supernatural or all-knowing force. Christianity addresses questions regarding the 
reason suffering exists and what the Creator intended by allowing such experiences as pain, loss, 
and hatred through the premise of free will, God’s gift to man to ultimately affect his own destiny. 
This serves to acknowledge the uncertainty about why God would inflict tragedy on those to whom 
he gave life, but complete knowledge is unattainable.   
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 In Terence Nichols’ Miracles In Science and Theology, the miracle is thought to be “an 
event that is consistent with but transcends natural processes” (Nichols 703). What this suggests 
is that miracles do not by definition undermine science; instead, they surpass what could be 
expected or predicted by traditional means. Nichols goes on to explain that:  
 
Miracles are better understood as signs of divine action, which, like grace, do not 
violate nature but work through it, perfect it, and reveal its divine ground. Nature is not 
a closed system but an open system within a larger, divine context; viewed within this 
context, miracles can be seen as rational and even lawlike events that express the divine 
ground within which nature exists. Just as the laws of nature behave in extreme ways 
in unusual contexts (for example, superconductivity or black holes), so it may be that 
the ordinary laws of nature, within a context of faith, behave in unexpected ways. 
(Nichols 705)    
 
This author suggests that the theological framework views miracles as evidence of the existence 
of God, confirmation of his divine presence through acts we cannot always explain. Thus, he 
disagrees with the common scientific definition, attributed to David Hume and a product of 
scientific progress that a miracle is “a violation of the laws of nature” (Nichols 704). In science, it 
is noted that an explanation for miracles is necessary because their very essence contradicts the 
fundamental aspects of science by being an example of “inexplicable and irreproducible 
phenomena” (Nichols 704). However, despite the seemingly polarized perspectives on miraculous 
occurrences adopted by science and religion, Nichols believes there is merit in studying these 
events to further our knowledge about our world and deepen our understanding of both domains. 
In acknowledging the reality that there is not a consensus on whether miracles truly are divine acts 
of God or simply are natural physical processes, we can see that limitations to our 
conceptualization and understanding of events do exist as is made evident by this lack of certainty. 
Christianity further explains these limits as existing not only in practice but also in principle, 
designed by the all-knowing and all-loving vision and purpose of the divine.  
 
Knowledge and Science 
 Science is responsible for countless achievements affecting our lives in powerful ways on 
an immediate and long term basis. Science has proven to be a discipline deserving of great prestige 
in our society, expanding our knowledge of our own biology, the physical world, and providing 
theoretical frameworks for such sophisticated concepts as quantum mechanics. The aims of science 
include discovery, explanation, as well as the expansion of knowledge of the world and its complex 
and dynamic components. The breakthroughs of scientists have saved lives as well as promoted a 
sense of curiosity and yearning to learn more, faster. In Henry Bauer’s Scientific Literacy and the 
Myth of the Scientific Method, the known, the known unknown, and the unknown unknown are 
identified as categories in which science seeks to gain deeper understanding. Although scientists 
are able to identify beginning realms in which we have not yet attained a wealth of knowledge, it 
is difficult to reach a level of certainty in the many facets of science when exploring what remains 
to be discovered; this is due to the fluid nature of the physical world, its impermanence and depth 
of which we cannot begin to ascertain. 
 
Knowledge and Reason 
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 The limitations of human knowledge as defined by various elements of logical reasoning, 
including those relevant to science, mathematics, and philosophy, are explored throughout Noson 
Yanofsky’s The Outer Limits of Reason. This author takes the stance that there are limitations to 
the possible discoveries humankind can achieve. Through the careful analysis of the above 
disciplines, Yanofsky suggests one can identify specific areas, problems, and questions that are 
inaccessible or unsolvable. Despite noteworthy historical achievements and those that will 
undoubtedly come to fruition in the future, limitations do exist, establishing a boundary between 
what becomes known and that which remains out of reach.  
 Reason is a central concept explored by Noson Yanofsky. The true definition of reason 
proves more complicated than it may initially appear. Perspectives vary between individuals, and 
philosophers have yet to come to a consensus regarding a universal meaning of what is reasonable 
and the forces that guide reason in human beings. Often associated with virtue and wisdom, reason 
influences thought, behavior, and the justification of both. What remains after all of the conflicting 
viewpoints are processed is the underlying proposition that “one cannot use reason to derive 
contradictions and false facts” (Yanofsky 345). As a result, reason must result in revelations 
yielding insight that has proven to be supported, or at least has yet to be disproven or fundamentally 
challenged. Understanding reason is crucial so that one may discern what is real and what is 
subjective or contradictory. However, reason itself is not a constant; over time, with expanding 
knowledge comes the realization of falsities and errors previously believed to be reasonable 
(Yanofsky 346). 
 Thus, science, a field which relies largely on reason, valuing concrete supportive evidence 
to validate claims, is not a constant either. Rather, it is the ongoing practice of evolving discoveries 
and theories, to which reason must correspond or changes must be made. The limits of a human’s 
knowledge of science, then, parallel the limits present in the field itself. What must be true in the 
physical world is that there cannot be something that is at once both true and false; when our 
reasoning suggests that there is something false, the limitation lies within our reasoning (Yanofsky 
346). Additionally, this author identifies the reality that we do not even have an awareness of what 
causes us to act in an irrational manner, coming to false conclusions and erring in our logic. We 
are more capable of determining the wrong outcome than the right, which usually will change over 
time. There are many examples of instances where what was previously believed to be a scientific 
truth ultimately was proven false and also beliefs which were discounted but in the end proved 
justifiable. For instance, phrenology was once a common practice in seeking to identify patterns 
characteristic of human behavior by studying an individual’s bone structure around their brain 
(Yanofsky 346). Only relatively recently was this discredited as an unsound approach. On the other 
hand, Yanofsky discusses the fact that Louis Pasteur, a chemist and microbiologist, and Ignaz 
Semmelweis, a physician, raised the notion of germ theory, which was met with doubt and disbelief 
(347). Today, its relevance and acceptance has vastly expanded in modern society. In The Outer 
Limits of Reason,  the discourse regarding reason itself continues to come into play in significant 
ways as the author forms connections with limits that present in various other aspects of life. 
 The perspective conveyed by this professor of computer and information science centers 
around four defining limitations believed to exist in the lives of human beings. These categories 
include: physical limitations, mental-construct limitations, practical limitations, and limitations of 
intuition (Yanofsky 341). Physical limitations, as explained by Yanofsky, pertain to the belief that 
we may not use reason to “permit a certain physical object or physical process to exist” (Yanofsky 
340). Examples include limitations of computers and even quantum mechanics as being 
unpredictable to some extent, unable to be anticipated or expected. Paradoxes and unsolvable 
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problems cannot be solved through reason or other means. We cannot simply explain conditions 
into existence by means of reason alone when physical properties suggest impossibility; there must 
be other supporting elements to our determination. The author continues with an exploration of 
what he considers limitations of our mental constructs.  
 Yanofsky suggests that there are various identifiable mental states and ideas that are 
impossible to exist; he supports his argument by turning to language, a central element influencing 
the processes of our knowledge. Specifically, he cites scenarios such as sentences which are at 
once both true and false, and thus incomprehensible to the human mind. Examples such as 
vagueness of specifications, descriptions, and statements prove to highlight our limitations of logic 
(Yanofsky 341). When inconsistencies exist, Yanofsky points out the tendency of human beings 
to steer clear of confronting these issues. However, in the common use of language, people do not 
have such a vehement opposition to contradiction; rules can be broken as a means of avoiding 
potential limitations of language. On the other hand, the same is not true when referring to physical 
objects and properties as we strive to express the ultimate reality (Yanofsky 342). Reductionism 
comes into play in that one limitation, once discovered, often gives way to others; negation, for 
example, often accompanies self-referentiality, thus illustrating a limit of the original principle and 
our ability to overcome it (Yanofsky 344). In addition to these in principle limitations, Yanofsky 
continues with an exploration regarding limitations of a practical nature. 
 Rather than emphasizing the impossibility of the previously discussed facets of knowledge, 
practical limitations focus on those feats of knowledge which are possible but are considered by 
the author to be “extremely improbable” (Yanofsky 342). To see them through to full realization 
would not only be extremely time intensive, unrealistic, and demanding of finite resources, but 
also require dedication beyond what human beings would naturally be inclined to demonstrate. 
Chaotic systems, defined as having “sensitive dependence on initial conditions”, including weather 
predictions and anticipation of certain behaviors and phenomena, fall under this domain (Yanofsky 
164). This is indicative of a limitation as the ultimate effects of such elements cannot be fully 
understood, depending largely on initial conditions and subject to corresponding, unpredictable 
changes to the end result throughout the processes that occur over time. In addition to these 
limitations of practicality, Yanofsky includes information on intuition and limits of our 
unconscious understanding. 
 Pondering limits of intuition offers insight into the way the human mind processes 
information and responds to stimuli of various types. Limits in this case can be defined again as 
errors, because false beliefs and perceptions do in fact limit our accurate perspective of the 
objective world of knowledge. Especially pertaining to science, limitations of knowledge can be 
found in instances of self-referentiality (Yanofsky 343). When an occurrence or process refers to 
its own characteristics, it must be accompanied by limitations. Furthermore, what we are able to 
describe based on our current body of knowledge represents only part of the whole picture; it is 
incomplete as it leaves out what is unknown and what has not even been identified as yet to be 
discovered. With the limitations explored in the work The Outer Limits of Reason in mind, other 
aspects of human knowledge and cognition can shed light on additional components of learning 
and limits. 
 
Knowledge and Memory  
 An interesting and abstract area in which the limits of human cognition also become 
evident proves to be memory. Forces influencing our memory have been explored from a scientific 
perspective and include factors such as age, emotional state, and physical health at the time of a 
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given experience. For example, the capacity of a human being’s memory includes various lapses 
as well as misconceptions. Little is remembered from one’s early years, as the process of storing 
memories is just unfolding, and details quickly fade and become inaccessible as time continues to 
pass. The loss of memory also accompanies the aging process; from forgetting dates or events to 
diagnosable conditions such as Alzheimer’s disease or dementia, remembering even the simple 
things becomes something we no longer take for granted.  
 In addition, throughout one’s lifetime factors such as trauma or heightened emotional states 
may inhibit the formation and retention of facts or experiences. This can serve as an explanation 
for instances such as eyewitness misidentification or false memory. Furthermore, certain memories 
in our subjective minds are given greater weight than others. Our conscious and subconscious 
thoughts mold our perceptions and influence which items remain prominent in our mind and which 
fall to the background, further and further from our reach, replaced by those we choose to 
emphasize. This can occur due to one’s interests and drives, or to external factors such as 
surroundings and life circumstances. When we are not able to retrieve memory, or when we create 
it falsely according to our own subjective state, it is a phenomenon out of our control, and this is 
evidence indicative of a natural limitation of knowledge.  
 While the limitations of memory exist in practice throughout many aspects of the life of a 
human being, in principle limitations can be revealed through the exploration of such functional 
limitations. Limitations which present themselves in practice form the foundation of ultimate 
limitations, those about which we cannot develop a full understanding. That human beings have 
limitations presents the opportunity for faith to enter our lives. Revelations of this type serve to 
highlight the importance of considering limitations in practice, which often then lead to 
corresponding discoveries of the essence of in principle limits to humanity.   
 
Knowledge, Interest, and Motivation 
 A parallel to the concept of limitations of memory is the notion that we are limited by the 
very things which we are attracted to or are interested in pursuing. The content or domains an 
individual decides to explore and learn, gaining knowledge and awareness of them, are in large 
part determined by innate drives and forces that we do not consciously set out to choose. It is not 
as if human beings actively select interests or passions that captivate our minds and attention. 
Instead, we follow paths according to our instinctual drives, abilities, and capacities, which vary 
greatly from person to person and even within the lifetime of one human being (Bauer 32). This 
in turn serves to control the extent of what we discover and the areas of study we are exposed to 
in the first place. Limits come into play because, in opening doors for us, the processes of both 
nature and nurture invariably close others as a result. We simply do not demonstrate an interest or 
calling for all things, and this is in fact what makes each person unique, we all possess distinctive 
characteristics and tendencies. 
 To build upon the framework of individual instinct and interest limiting which aspects of 
the world we even become exposed to, let alone have the chance to truly enrich our minds with, 
Henry Bauer discusses a relevant idea regarding motivation. He claims that “Scientists choose 
projects that offer a reasonable prospect of success, for without being successful, scientists cannot 
make careers for themselves” (Bauer 7). Factors which motivate us are also unique to each 
individual. However, certain forces that exert power over us are almost universal, including those 
related to recognition, reward, and fulfillment. Acknowledging this tendency allows us to 
understand another cause for limitations to our potential knowledge and cognition. What motivates 
each one of us has the ability to influence our direction, actions, and where we spend our time. 
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Consequently, if we pursue a course of study or profession based upon intrinsic or extrinsic 
motivators, to earn the most money for example, by default we are narrowing our awareness of 
other possibilities and restricted in the realms that we will have the chance to discover.   
 Thus, science, too, offers a natural opportunity for exploring questions of fundamental 
knowledge, the limits of our cognition for the study of external forces. It could be suggested that, 
what Bauer claims to be the “myth of the scientific method”, is in fact an indication of a limit when 
our constructs of the world and reality come up against forces beyond our control, or the ultimate 
reality: defining forces created and maintained by an external power surpassing our ability to both 
study and comprehend. Is the reliance on “models” additional evidence of our limitations, or 
merely representative of the possibilities remaining for our future discovery and refinement of 
processes and laws? How do we know whether these findings, grounded in scientific methods, 
really reflect objective truths when such change and evolution of concepts has undeniably 
dominated the discipline's history, and the history of human beings. While it seems that certain 
fields of scientific progress, such as quantum mechanics, have propelled us forward into better 
understanding of what was once largely unknown and unexplained, exceptions and anomalies do 
remain. Quantum mechanics, “probably the greatest development in all of physics”, has yet to 
provide a concrete description of the force of gravity (Yanofsky 175). While this framework 
otherwise accurately describes our physical world, the future will likely bring changes to these 
theories too, as our history consistently demonstrates occurs as time unfolds and new proofs are 
uncovered and others disproven. Complete knowledge of the ultimate truth, it seems, will always 
remain out of reach during the life of a human.  
 
Conclusion 
 It can be posited that science offers a compelling illusion of limitless discovery, while the 
ultimate reality will remain unknown to us as human beings, as our construct for the world is a 
conventional tool to allow for conceptualization of our surroundings and a fulfillment of the desire 
to learn and grow. It gives us the opportunity to learn about our world in concrete and abstract 
ways, through observation, experimentation, and logical reasoning for example. This discipline 
also has produced findings that have saved lives and improved both the quality and direction of 
our species’ future on various levels with technology, medicine, and groundbreaking revelations 
of how our physical world works and the processes that occur to create the universe and ourselves. 
New concepts capture the attention of leading scientists and those simply curious about learning 
more about how the world works, and represent a fundamental quest of the scientific discipline.  
 Changes to theories unfold as time progresses and new discoveries are made, replacing and 
modifying others which were once thought to be true or conclusive. Defining characteristics of 
each individual drive him or her to pursue certain directions, ultimately affecting and limiting 
others that might have been discovered. Concrete limitations to our mental capacity, memory, and 
motivation alter our course and put a cap on the parts of our world to which we even become 
introduced. However, if science was approached from a viewpoint of limitations, it is hard to 
imagine the progress we see today being realized. Overall, science allows for us to conceptualize 
physical phenomena and experiences, while acknowledging without being discouraged by our 
limitations, maintaining the goals of constant discovery to enrich our lives and satisfy our minds, 
to the best of our ability. 
 Religion seems to offer a complementary yet unique perspective on our limitations, 
embracing the truth that humans are uncertain about fundamental questions, and that these 
unknowns are an inherent aspect of the life that we are destined to live. Through both ideology 
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and science, we improve functionality to facilitate our ease of existence and attain subjective and 
relative “knowledge” to fuel our minds’ desire to learn and grow. Religion begins where science 
leaves off, as limitations to reason have allowed for the practice of faith. Being human is not 
without limitations, but this reality need not undermine the relevance of the discoveries, 
frameworks, and constructs that we as a species have developed, evolved, and maintained over 
time. While many argue that the abilities of human beings with regards to the acquisition of 
knowledge are limitless and ever increasing, evidence from both religious and scientific domains 
supports the notion that limitations are in fact both practical and intrinsic components of our 
existence. In fact, I hold the belief that the religious and biological limits we experience whilst on 
earth exist as a meaningful intention, to guide the very purpose of our lives, ultimately 
complementary to our scientific endeavors. The principles of faith and practices of science shape 
and affect our spiritual and physical existence. We are, in fact, limited in both domains, but the 
limits of science exist to leave room for faith and religious experience.  
 Limitations must not always be viewed as demeaning or as hindrances to humankind. They 
can serve as the very catalysts for growth and allow for the practice of faith to fulfill our need for 
expression and exploration of that which cannot be captured and proven by the methods of science. 
As explained by Stephen Jay Gould, the belief that science and religion are “nonoverlapping 
magisteria”, distinct in purpose and purview, sheds light on the meaning and value inherent within 
each domain, independent from one another, but both furthering our human experience (Gould). 
Faith is what exists beyond the limits of knowledge, and as Albert Einstein stated, “Once we accept 
our limits, we go beyond them” (Boudreau et al. 111). Thus, science and religion, while in apparent 
conflict in various instances, in fact offer complementary perspectives in the exploration of 
compelling questions such as limits of our cognition and our existence, allowing us to further 
explore the meaning of this life.  
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